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Abstract
Today people from all lifestyles, government officials, researchers and ex-
ecutives use internet. The people start to depend on internet for their
daily life. However, the increased dependence comes with a great risk.
The popularity and potential of internet attracts users with illegal in-
tentions as well.
The attackers generally establish a connection chain by logging in to a
number of intermediary hosts before launching an attack at the victim
host. These intermediary hosts are called as stepping-stones. On the
victim side, it becomes hard to detect that the peer communicating with
the victim is whether a real originator of the connection or it is merely
acting as an intermediary host in the connection chain.
This master dissertation proposed an approach based on Interarrival
packet time to distinguish an incoming connection from a connection
coming via some intermediary hosts. The proposed approach uses infor-
mation available at the receiving end and applicable to encrypted traffic
too. The approach was successfully tested for SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP
and SMTP protocols and implemented in to an intrusion detection sys-
tem for corresponding protocols.
The main applications for the proposed approach are Manual intrusion
detection, Tor usage detection and Spam messages detection. The ap-
proach is also applicable for the digital forensics investigations.
Keywords : Network security, Stepping stone detection, Manual intru-
sion detection, Tor usage detection, Spam detection and Digital forensics
investigation.
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“Three Rules of Work:
Out of clutter find simplicity
From discord find harmony
In the middle of difficulty
lies opportunity.”
Albert Einstein
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Internet is one of the most significant inventions in history of the mankind. When
internet was developed in 1970s, it was supposed to use only by government and
scientific communities. Today it is used by people working in all sectors, from gov-
ernment, scientific to e-commerce sectors. It is a valuable information resource and
provides wide spectrum of features to its users which allures them.
There is a trend in current society that where there is something of potential
value, there is a potential of crime too. Cyber attacks on nation infrastructure, like
military or commercial system, are an example of potential cyber attacks. In 2003,
Slammer worm [28] infected Ohio state nuclear power plant and disabled security
monitoring system. In 2007, the world’s first cyber terrorism attack on Estonia [26]
targeted government, credit card system and social service websites, and caused na-
tionwide denial of service attack. In 2009, Conflicker worm [35] has infected millions
of systems worldwide and created a large scale botnet to send spam. These are some
of the recent examples of attacks launched with highly sophisticated technology to
cause disruption on large scale.
Recently there is a rising demand for the user privacy on internet. The Onion
Router (Tor) [48] is a framework of virtual tunnel which provides anonymous com-
munication to improve privacy on internet. The Tor middle nodes (by default 3
nodes) in the network path between client and server works as proxy for client and
provide anonymous communication. But due to anonymous communication, it at-
tracts attackers who use Tor to launch attacks and hide their true identities. The
study conducted by Damon et. al [38] suggested that Tor is mis-used mainly for
copyright infringement, hacking attempts and web page defacement.
Another growing problem on internet is of unsolicited email message called spam.
On internet approximately 90-95% [1] email messages are spam and every day 30
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billion messages are sent through internet. The problem of spam is their unwanted
use of network resources and their use to harm recipients by phishing scams or mal-
ware infections. Ramachandran et al. [45] studied the network level characteristics
of spam messages and found out the source of most spam message is botnets. The
bots in botnets work as proxy for spammers and help them to hide their true ad-
dresses.
The number of network based attacks and their scale of disruption is growing
because attackers can very easily hide their true network identities and thereby
reduce their chances of being captured and punished. The attackers relay their at-
tacks through intermediary hosts/proxy system to hide their true addresses. On
the receiver side, it becomes hard to detect whether peer communicating with the
receiving host is a real originator of a connection or it is merely relaying the connec-
tion. In digital investigation this uncertainty causes the peer communicating with
receiver to become victim of suspicion for launching the attack. If the presence of
an intermediary host in a connection can be detected at the receiving end, then the
mentioned attacks can be stopped at early stages by close monitoring such suspi-
cious connections and taking actions accordingly.
The objective of this thesis work is to investigate the network latency information
at receiving end and propose a method to detect the presence of intermediary host
in the connection using the available information. In this thesis work, the term
intermediary host and proxy system are used interchangeably.
1.2 Problem Description
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) uses flow control and congestion control al-
gorithms to control the amount of data transmitted to receiver. These algorithms
deal with different network latency conditions automatically by limiting the amount
of unacked data that can be injected in to the network. This result in arrivals of
data bursts with pauses in between at the receiver end.
The lengths of these data bursts and paused delays depend on the network la-
tency and other factors such as the application protocol (Telnet, SSH, SMTP or
HTTP etc.) used in the communication. These lengths, to a certain degree, will
propagate through intermediary hosts. The task of this thesis work is to detect, if
possible, the peer communicating with local host is the real originator of a connec-
tion or it is merely acting as a proxy in the connection chain. Whether detection
can be done by analyzing the network latency information implied by these bursts
and delay in data arrival at receiving end ?
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The possible applications which can be benefited from such detection should
be outlined. If possible, a scheme to fight against spam or automated computer
intrusion detection should be outlined.
1.3 Research Methodology
The abusive usage of intermediary hosts by attackers was addressed by Staniford-
Chen and Heberlein [50]. They address the problem of abusing intermediary hosts
called stepping stone in interactive sessions using telnet. After the proposal of
Staniford-Chen, several approaches [21, 27, 52, 57, 58] have been proposed to detect
encrypted stepping stone attacks. All these proposed approaches depend upon in-
formation available from many monitoring points deployed in the network to detect
the stepping stones in a connection chain.
There are some active methods to detect the presence of intermediary hosts by
making the client system to execute some code. The tool in [10] downloads a Java
applet included in web page on the client machine and this applet sends network
information such as local machine IP address back to the server. The tool in [5]
uses the style sheet included within a web page to detect the Tor usage. Some more
methods to detect the proxy usage from HTTP GET request header fields are listed
in [11].
Most of the methodologies devised to fight against spam messages are based
upon content inspection. The filtering of spam messages based on content inspec-
tion successfully reduces the amount of spam that actually reaches up to a user’s
account. One of the main tool, which employed this methodology is SpamAssas-
sin [13]. In addition to the content based inspection schemes, many email message
filters also perform address lookups to determine whether the sender IP address is
in Blacklist [33] or not. But the problem with these approaches is that the spammer
can change the message contents easily and bypass filtering. The study conducted
in [45] suggested that mostly spam messages are sent by botnets with many short
lived IP address systems which reduces the blacklists effectiveness.
The approach proposed in this thesis work monitors connection at the receiving
end. The monitoring process records the Inter Arrival Packet Time of incoming
packets from the sender and based on this information a decision is made about
presence of intermediary hosts in the connection. The approach can be used to
detect stepping stones in the case of telnet/ssh, to detect presence of Tor nodes in
the case of HTTP or to detect the proxy used in relaying spam. Our approach does
3
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not rely on packet contents, packet size or number of packets and thus applicable to
encrypted traffic.
1.4 Scope of Research Work
This thesis work tries to detect the presence of intermediary hosts/proxy system in
an incoming connection at the receiving end. The approach proposed in this the-
sis work makes no attempt to trace the connection source to its real origin point.
The proposed approach tries to detect the use of an intermediary host, when delay
between an intermediary host and the real originator is considerable. The use of
application level gateways/firewalls will not cause a false alarm for this approach
due to a very small delay on connection between the original source and the gateway.
TCP behaves differently under different network delay conditions. This result
in the variation of data bursts and length of delay pauses at the receiving end.
The length of data bursts and pauses also depends on the application protocols
used for communication. This thesis work studies Telnet, SSH, FTP, HTTP and
SMTP application protocols. The decision to choose these protocols is based on
their widespread use. Also, these protocols mainly use a proxy either due to some
restriction in an organization for remote access from internet or by attackers to hide
their true identities.
1.5 Document Structure
The thesis report consists of six chapters.
 Background and Tools Used: This chapter specifies the essential TCP
behavior for this thesis work. The available related work is outlined in this
chapter. The tools used to perform the experiment and investigate the TCP
behavior are also explained in the chapter.
 The Technical Approach and System Model: This chapter explains the
evolution process of the proposed approach. This chapter describes the system
model built for the proposed approach.
 The Remote Login Protocols: This chapter describes the behavior of
the remote login protocols Telnet and SSH. The protocols are studied under
different network delay conditions. The results obtained from the experiments
are analyzed and discussed. The implementation of the proposed approach for
these protocols is also presented there.
4
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 The FTP and HTTP Protocol: This chapter explains the FTP and HTTP
behavior under different network delay conditions. The results, discussion
and possible applications are outlined. The implementation of the proposed
approach for these protocols is also presented.
 The SMTP Protocol: This chapter studies the SMTP behavior under dif-
ferent network delay conditions. The results, discussion and possible applica-
tions are specified. The implementation of the proposed approach for SMTP
protocol is also presented in the chapter.
 Conclusion and Future Work: This chapter summarizes the results and
findings, specifies some future work and concludes this thesis work.
All the data files captured during experiments are made available online with this
report. The implementation code is provided in appendix A. The scripts used to
perform experiments are also made available online with this report.
5

“Freedom from the
desire for an answer
is essential to the
understanding of a problem.”
Jiddu Krishnamurti 2
Background and Tools Used
2.1 The Essential TCP Behavior
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is one of the main transport protocols used
by Internet to transport the data from one system to another system. TCP operates
at a transport layer and controls the data transmission between two end systems
e.g. a web server and a web client. TCP provides a reliable and ordered delivery
of a byte stream from one application running on a local system to another appli-
cation running on a remote system. TCP uses a connection established between a
client and a server using 3-way handshake to transfer data between them. In TCP
each byte has a sequence number assigned to it which identify the order of data
sent from each computer, so that the data can be transferred reliably and in order
regardless of ant packet loss, fragmentation or disordering on the network path up
to the receiver. TCP uses a cumulative acknowledgment scheme, in which the re-
ceiver sends an acknowledgment to a sender telling that the receiver has received
all the data preceding to this acknowledgment number. The sequence number and
acknowledgment number helps the TCP end systems to discard duplicate packets,
to retransmit lost packets or to perform the ordering in out of order packet arrival.
To control the rate at which data will be transferred between the end systems,
TCP uses a sliding window flow control protocol. In each TCP segment the receiver
specifies the receiver window (rwnd), suggesting the amount of data it can buffer
for this connection. To avoid sending small size segments either due to small rwnd
size or less amount of data emitted by the application e.g. telnet, TCP sender uses
Nagle Algorithm [39]. The Nagle algorithm inhibits the sender from sending the
new TCP segments if any previously transmitted data on a connection remains un-
acknowledged. The new TCP data can be sent immediately in two cases. Firstly,
if the TCP connection is just established or it was idle for some time. Secondly, if
the available window size > Maximum Segment Size (MSS) and size of data to be
sent > MSS. Otherwise the transfer of new TCP segment will wait until an ACK of
previously sent segments has been arrived.
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The TCP sender uses congestion control algorithms to avoid congestion collapse
in the network. These congestion control algorithms control the amount of outgoing
data being injected into the network. The TCP sender uses slow start and conges-
tion avoidance algorithms [18] for this purpose. These algorithms make use of two
variables congestion window (cwnd), the sender side limit on transmitting data, and
slow start threshold (ssthresh), a variable to determine whether to use slow start or
congestion avoidance algorithm. After the handshake is completed, the TCP sender
uses Initial Window(IW), initial value of cwnd, to determine the amount of data to
be injected in to the network. From [18], IW size is defined as 2*MSS bytes, but
some non-standard experimental TCP extensions [17] defines IW as
If (MSS <= 1095 bytes)
then win <= 4 * MSS;
If (1095 bytes < MSS < 2190 bytes)
then win <= 4380;
If (2190 bytes <= MSS)
then win <= 2 * MSS;
Where MSS is allowed Maximum Segment Size on the given network path. The
sender sets the initial value of ssthresh equal to the size of advertised window. Dur-
ing the slow start, a TCP sender will increment the cwnd by MSS on arrival of
each non-duplicate ACK. The slow start ends when cwnd exceeds ssthresh or when
congestion is observed. During congestion avoidance, cwnd is incremented by only
one MSS bytes on each RTT.
When the packet loss occurs on the connection, a TCP sender can detect it by
either timeout of its retransmission timer or arrival of 3 duplicate ACKs from the
receiver. In case of retransmission timer timeout (RTO), the value of cwnd is set to
loss window, which is equal to 1 MSS. whereas in other case, the TCP retransmits
lost segment without waiting for RTO to expire and uses fast retransmit algorithm.
After retransmission, the fast recovery governs data transfer until non-duplicate
ACK arrives. After this, the cwnd is set to ssthresh.
ssthresh = max (FlightSize/2, 2*MSS)
where Flightsize is amount of outstanding data in the network. Then the TCP
sender will transmit data according to cwnd value by using the congestion avoid-
ance. If TCP has not received a segment for more than one RTO then the connection
is assumed to be idle and cwnd is reduced to the value of Restart Window (RW)
which is RW = min(IW, cwnd). On this idle connection, the data can be sent to
receiver using this cwnd value as soon as it arrives from the user.
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An important inference can be drawn from the above discussion regarding the
TCP behavior. Initially the TCP sender has cwnd of size 2-3 MSS, the sender will
send 2-3 segments to receiver and wait for ACK to arrive. The receiver will receive
these segments after half of the RTT delay on a connection and upon receiving these
segments receiver will send an ACK back to the sender. The sender will receive the
ACK after waiting time equal to one complete RTT delay of the connection. After
the ACK arrival, sender will increment the cwnd size and send more segments to
the receiver. Due to the wait for ACK at the sender side, the next TCP segment at
receiver end will arrive after a gap of one complete RTT. The same phenomenon will
repeat itself at receiver side but with a diminishing size of time gap. The arrival of
ACK at sender will result in an increment in cwnd size. Therefore, more and more
segments will be sent before waiting for an ACK. This causes the new segment to
arrive at the receiving end while the sender is still sending segments allowed by the
cwnd size. The receiver will send an ACK for arrived segments to the sender, which
may arrive at the sender while it is sending segments or after small waiting time
compare to RTT.
If there is any packet loss in the network, it will cause cwnd to reduce its size.
This will result in a larger waiting time gap as described above at the receiving end.
This behavior will preserve itself even if the connection is a part of a connection chain
established up to the receiver via some proxies in the network path. On receiver end,
the packets will arrive after a gap of maximum RTT delay on any connection in the
connection chain up to the receiver. If RTT of a connection between a receiver and
a peer communicating with it is small compared to RTT on any connection behind
the peer in connection chain, then this will be noticeable at the receiving end.
2.2 Related Work
The abusive usage of intermediary hosts by attackers is first analyzed by Staniford-
Chen and Heberlein [50]. They addressed the problem of abusing intermediary hosts
in the interactive sessions using Telnet. In the interactive sessions, the attacker
launches an attack by logging into a remote system and then logging into another
remote system and thus making a connection chain up to the victim system. They
defined the problem of detecting stepping-stones to trace the identity of attacker
using traffic contents. They proposed to use the contents thumbprints to compare
two different flows around the same time on the network. The thumbprints are used
to find a correlation between flows. If two flows have almost the same thumbprints
then they are most likely to be a part of the same connection chain. The idea relies
mainly on the traffic contents and therefore is not applicable to the encrypted traffic.
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After the proposal of Staniford-Chen, several authors have proposed methods
to detect encrypted stepping stone attacks. The first approach to use the timing
information of a connection to trace the stepping stones was proposed by Zhang
and Paxon [58]. In their approach, they calculated the correlation of different flows
based on OFF periods of the each flow. A period is considered an OFF period, if
there is no data traffic in the flow for more than a specific time period threshold.
Their approach is based on the observation that if two flows are in the same con-
nection chain then their OFF period coincides with each other. The scheme mainly
requires that the flows are synchronized.
Yoda and Etoh [57] proposed a method to detect the stepping stone connection
based on deviation of two different flows. The deviation is defined as the difference
between average propagation delay and minimum propagation delay between two
flows. The approach makes use of monitoring points deployed in Internet to monitor
the connections and log in to records. These logged records will be used to compare
with records from the compromised host. The observation behind this scheme is
that the deviation of two uncorrelated flow will be large enough to differentiate it
from the deviation of correlated flows in same connection chain.
Wang et al. [52] proposed a correlation scheme using Inter-Packet Delay (IPD)
time of a connection to detect stepping stones. The scheme is based on the observa-
tion that in an interactive session, incoming and outgoing flow from a stepping stone
are correlated. The correlation metric is defined over IPDs in a sliding window of
packets of connections to be correlated. They suggested that the IPD of interactive
sessions like Telnet, SSH or Rlogin are preserved across many hops and stepping
stones. They have shown that their method works well if connections on different
paths have distinctive timing characteristics.
The drawback of the above mentioned approaches is that they are vulnerable
to active timing perturbation by the attacker. When timing perturbation is added
to the flows, timing information used in the deviation and IPD calculation may be
destroyed. The correlation between OFF periods will also be destroyed and result
in the high false negative rates. Donoh et al. [27] indicated that there are theo-
retical limits on the ability of attackers to evade detection using timing or chaff
perturbations for the sufficiently long connections. They assumed that attacker has
maximum delay tolerance. They used wavelets and similar multiscale methods to
separate the short-term behavior of the flows from the long-term behavior. Their
method requires the intrusion connections to remain in connected state for longer
periods.
Wang and Reeves [52] presented an active watermarking scheme, which is de-
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signed to be robust against timing perturbations. They introduced watermark into
a connection by slightly adjusting packet interarrival times of the selected pack-
ets in a flow. The watermark introduced is used to correlate the independent and
identically distributed perturbation. This scheme suggested that if the timing per-
turbation were not large enough, the watermark information would remain along
the connection chain.
The aforementioned approaches mainly use the timing related information of
a connection to detect the stepping stones in the connection chain. A number of
advanced approaches was also proposed to address dummy packets (called chaff )
that can be added by an attacker, in addition to timing perturbations. These ap-
proaches provided a lower bounds on amount of chaff required to evade detection [21]
and upper bounds on the number of packets required for confident detection [59],
and compare tradeoffs among detection rates, false positive rate and computation
cost [43]. However, all these schemes use many monitoring points deployed in the
network to perform calculation of the deviation or correlation to detect the stepping
stones.
The approach proposed in the present thesis work monitors incoming connection
only at the receiving end and uses interarrival packet time to detect the presence
of intermediary hosts. The intermediary host can be acting like a stepping stone
in case of the interactive session or any proxy used under SMTP, HTTP or FTP
session. The scheme does not try to trace the connection to its real origin point but
tries to detect the presence of intermediary hosts in an incoming connection.
2.3 Experimentation Tools
2.3.1 Testbed
A testbed was needed to perform the experiments for thesis work. There are some
publicly available testbeds and they are classified by [12] into four categories: clus-
ter testbeds, overlay testbeds, federated testbeds and networking research kits. The
Emulab, a component of Netbed [53], is an example of the clustered testbed. The
overlay testbed examples are DARTnet (DARPA Research Testbed network) [16],
the wide area component of Netbed [53], Planetlab [20] etc. The federated testbed
can be created by interconnecting the several available research testbeds. The ATM
switches kit distributed by Washington University [51] is an example of network-
ing research kits. The DETER (Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research)
testbed [6] is designed to provide an experimental testbed for the cyber security
research and develop mitigations mechanisms against the new threats. In the DE-
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TER, a user can remotely log in and allocate the network resources, load disk images
and start experimentation. The LARIAT (Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Informa-
tion Assurance Testbed) testbed [49] is an extension to DARPA’s intrusion detection
testbed. The LARIAT supports real-time, automated and quantitative evaluations
of the ID systems with script generated background traffic and real network attacks.
Considering the amount of work needed and available time for the present thesis
work, a Testbed is created at Department of Telematics, NTNU, Trondheim using
three computer systems. One system is used as a Server S, second system is used as
a Proxy P and third system is used as a Client C. All the three computer systems
are running Ubuntu 8.10 operating system with Kernel 2.6.27-11-generic. All
the systems are connected to ethernet LAN with 100Mbps capacity. The RTT
delay between the server and client system under normal conditions is less than 1
millisecond(ms).
2.3.2 TG: The Traffic Generator
The TG [14] program generates and receives one way traffic streams between the
traffic source and traffic sink nodes in the network. TG program is controlled by a
simple language, which specifies its operating mode, protocols, addressing function
and different traffic parameter. The TG program can either work as a traffic client
mode in which it sends data packets or as a traffic server mode in which it works
as a sink for the received traffic and sends an ACK in case of TCP traffic. TG
supports TCP and UDP transport protocols with unicast and multicast (UDP only)
addressing. TG can generate traffic with the several packet length and interarrival
packet time distributions e.g. exponential, uniform, markov etc. An example to
generate TCP traffic and send it to the TG server on host 129.241.208.198 at port
1234 is shown below.
on 0:5
tcp 129.241.208.198.1234
at 5 setup
at 6 arrival exponential 0.1 length exponential 576
seed 321423 time 10
The above configuration specifies that TG will wait for 5 seconds before initiating
connection setup to host 129.241.208.198. At 5 seconds, it will start a TCP
connection setup with interarrival packet time using exponential distribution with
mean of 0.1 seconds and segment length with mean of 576 bytes. The last line
specifies seed value used by distribution to generate a random value and time 10
specified that the communication will last for 10 seconds after the setup.
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2.3.3 Netcat: The GNU Netcat
The Netcat [7] is a simple UNIX utility, which can read and write data across the
network connections using TCP and UDP transport protocols. It is designed to
work as a back-end tool that can be used directly or invoked by other programs and
scripts. Some of its main features are as:
 Outbound and inbound TCP or UDP connections on any ports.
 Act as a general TCP proxy without considering application.
 Support for buffered send-mode (one line after every N seconds), hex dump of
transmitted or received data.
In the present thesis work, netcat is used to work mainly either listening at a specific
port for the incoming connection or working as a proxy for a TCP connection. Below
an example shows the netcat working as a proxy
$ mknod backpipe p
$ nc -l -v -p 1234 0<backpipe | nc 129.241.209.234 1234 1>backpipe
The first command creates a pipe on local file system to carry the data in both
directions. The second command makes the local host to listen for a connection at
port 1234. The received data on this port is forwarded to the host 129.241.208.198
at port 1234 and response is sent back to the client with help of a newly created
pipe.
2.3.4 Netem: The Network Emulator
To create the controlled Internet behavior in the laboratory, Netem [31] coupled
with Traffic Control (tc) tool is used. The both Netem and traffic control tool are
a part of iproute2 package of Linux kernel. The traffic control tool uses Netem
to emulate Internet behavior. Three main network emulators are available Netem,
DummyNet [47] and NIST Net [22]. DummyNet is an integrated part of FreeBSD
and is implemented as a part of packet filtering mechanism. DummyNet operates
on outgoing packets, which is similar to the Netem. The NIST net is a Linux kernel
extension and offers complex delay, loss and other emulation scenarios. The NIST
Net operates on incoming packets before they reach at protocol stack and uses a
high resolution timing source to perform its task. The NIST net is complex to use
and configure. The Netem uses most of NIST Net functionality and it is a part of
Linux kernel from version 2.6 onwards.
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The Netem uses existing Quality of Service (QoS) and Differentiated Service
(DiffServ) facilities in Linux kernel. Netem uses command line tool tc for the con-
figuration and a small kernel module for queuing discipline. The basic queuing
architecture of Linux kernel is shown in Figure 2.1. The queuing discipline sits
between the protocol output and the network device. The queuing discipline is
an object with two key interfaces. One interface receives packet from IP protocol
and another interface forwards these packets to the network device. The queuing
discipline makes the decision of forwarding packet based upon the defined policies.
The Linux kernel provides a rich set of disciplines for queuing, prioritization and
rate control policies. The default queuing discipline is FIFO queue but it can be
replaced with Priority queue, Token Buffer Filter (TBF) or Random Exponential
Drop (RED). The Priority queue is used in experiments performed during this thesis
work. The Priority queue is a classful queuing discipline and provides functionality
to filter packet based on flow id, destination address or other packet fields.
Figure 2.1: Linux Queuing Architecture
The Netem can add delay in network using various statistical distributions, can
cause a packet loss using statistical distributions or can do packet duplication. It can
perform packet re-ordering or corruption of every nth packet with given probability
percentage. An example is given below, which change queuing discipline for device
eth0 to priority queue and then attaches Netem to priority 3 queue with 20ms delay
using normal distribution. This rule is applied to packets, which are destined to IP
address 129.241.209.123.
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# tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: prio
# tc qdisc add dev eth0 parent 1:3 handle 30: netem \
delay 20ms 2ms distribution normal
# tc filter add dev eth0 parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 3 \
u32 match ip dst 129.241.209.123 flowid 10:3
2.3.5 Daemonlogger: The Packet Sniffer
The Daemonlogger [4] is a packet sniffer tool to sniff live traffic from a given interface.
The daemonlogger captures the incoming packets based on the given filter applied
during startup and store the captured packets in libpcap [9] file. The Linux kernel
uses different method to handle packet capturing stack. It uses queue instead of
buffer to store the capturing stack with pointers behind the applied filter. The Linux
kernel can cause a packet drop during capturing traffic at a high speed. To increase
the kernel capabilities and allow it to capture packet at high speed without causing
any packet drop, there is a need to increase the amount of memory space allocated
to kernel capturing engine. This allows kernel to handle incoming packets on high
speed connection without causing any degradation in capturing performance. This
is done by changing the Linux kernel parameter in /proc file system [8].
echo 33554432 > /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default
echo 33554432 > /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_max
echo 10000 > /proc/sys/net/core/netdev_max_backlog
From [29], allocating 32MB size of memory to Linux kernel capturing engine is
enough to capture packet up to 650 MBit/sec speed without causing any performance
degradation. The packets are captured from the monitoring system in the present
thesis work. The monitoring system can be either the server S or the client C
depending upon nature of the experiment.
2.3.6 Wireshark: The Packet Analyzer
The Wireshark [15] is a packet analyzer application, which understands the structure
of different networking protocols. It is able to dissect the captured packets in to
corresponding network protocol fields and provide their meaning along with detailed
information. The Wireshark provides various options to analyze captured packet
more efficiently and can capture live packets. It supports various capture and display
filters to show the required information in a user friendly way. An example is shown
below to see the interarrival packet time of HTTP GET request from the host
129.241.209.234.
filter: ip.src==129.241.209.234 and http.request
display filter: frame.time_delta
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The Wireshark has a capability to show the protocol specific statistics information
of the captured network session and draw corresponding graphs. It provides facility
to copy the required information in CSV format and enable user to perform complex
tasks on it.
2.3.7 Expect: The Automating Tool
The Expect [36] is a tool which automates the interactive applications such as SSH,
Telnet, FTP etc. It reads a script, which contains commands similar to dialogue
with a user and includes multiple paths depending upon the application response.
The Expect is used to produce reproducibility in typing behavior. It is not possible
for a human user to produce the exactly same typing behavior during more than
one test. Therefore, Expect provide consistency in typing behavior and delay under
all tests. The script contains:
 Send - This directs Expect to send the command to application as it is typed
by user himself.
 Expect - After sending command to application, Expect waits for response
matching a given expression with Expect directive and take action accordingly.
 Control Sequence (if/then/else/while etc.) - Expect supports high level
control flow and allows to take different action depends upon expression eval-
uation.
 Job Control - Expects enables control of more than one application simulta-
neously and allows execution of UNIX programs.
 User Interaction - Expects enables user to take control back during script
execution and returns control back to the Expect.
The Expect scripts are written in high level procedural language with elements taken
from C, LISP and Tcl. An example below shows how to start SSH session to given
username, password and IP address.
# set the command line parameters to variables
set user [lrange $argv 0 0]
set password [lrange $argv 1 1]
set ipaddr [lrange $argv 2 2]
# spawn the shell with ssh
spawn ssh $user@$ipaddr
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# check if host is communicating with target host for first
# time then send yes and store target host’s public key
# "*Connection refused*" {puts "Connection refused by
# Remote Host::$ipaddr"; exit}
while {1} {
expect {
"*yes/no*" {send -- "yes\r"}
"*$user@$ipaddr’s password: "
{break;}
}
}
# Below all the sleep statements are to simulate
# the user typing behavior
send -- "$password\r"
expect "*$user@*"
The script spawns a shell with ssh to a given host with specified username and
password. It checks if the connection attempt is for the first time and then it
sends yes to store peer’s public key. When connection prompts for password, loop
breaks itself and password is sent. After sending password, the command prompt is
expected to perform further tasks.
2.3.8 BRO: The Intrusion Detection System
The network intrusion detection systems are used to detect the unauthorized access
of network resources by the attackers. These systems can be divided into two cate-
gories. The first type of systems are those that rely on audit information gathered
by the hosts in a network, which they trying to protect. The second type of systems
are those that operate ”stand alone” by monitoring the network traffic directly using
a packet filter. These days hybrid systems are also getting popularity that combine
the two approaches. The Bro [41] is a standalone system for detecting the network
intruders in a real time by monitoring the network traffic.
Bro is divided in to an ”event engine” which converts stream of filtered packets in
to a stream of high level network events and an ”interpreter” which interpreters a
specialized language used to express the site’s security policy. The structure of Bro
system is shown in Figure 2.2. Bro uses libpcap [9] library to capture the packets
and isolates itself from details of the underlying network link technology (FDDI,
Ethernet, SLIP etc.). The libpcap uses available kernel packet filter BPF [37] to
reduce the traffic amount entering in to the system.
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Figure 2.2: Structure of Bro IDS system
The resulting stream of filtered packets is sent to the event engine, which first
perform integrity checks on the packet header and structure. If check fails, Bro gen-
erates an event indicating the cause and discards the packet. If the check succeeds
then the event engine looks up the connection state corresponding to the commu-
nicating peers and TCP or UDP ports, and creates a new state if none exists. It
then dispatches the packet to a handler specified by the site’s security policy. The
Policy script interpreter checks whether any events are generated by event engine or
not. If so, it processes events in FIFO fashion until the queue becomes empty. The
present thesis work uses Bro IDS to implement the proposed approach for different
application protocols. Bro provides support for implementing new algorithms to
detect the network intrusion.
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“Everything should be made
as simple as possible
but not simpler.”
Albert Einstein 3
The Technical Approach and System
Model
3.1 The Evolution of Approach
In the TCP protocol, the amount of data transmission is limited by allowed window
size (min(cwnd,rwnd)). The Nagle algorithm inhibits the sender to transmit small
size data packets in order to use the network resources more effectively. These two
principles make TCP to behave distinguishably in a connection with the different
Round Trip Time (RTT) delay. To study the variation of TCP behavior under
different network delay conditions, some tests are performed on the Testbed. The
intuition behind the performed tests is that in a connection with larger RTT delay,
the Nagle algorithm makes the sender wait for ACK to arrive and as a result, the
sender will send large size segments to the receiver. Therefore, to transfer the
same amount of data, the number of packets will decrease, as RTT delay in the
communication path will increase.
3.1.1 The Packet Size and the Packet Number Approach
To study the TCP behavior, two types of experiments are performed in the labo-
ratory. In the first experiment, TCP is used to transfer 1 MBytes of data between
the client (sender) and the server (receiver) with/without presence of proxy in the
network under different delay conditions. In the second experiment, the effect of
different delay conditions is studied on the traffic with small size application data.
A traffic generator tool Traffic Generator (TG) [14] is used to generate the TCP
traffic using an exponential distribution for the interarrival packet time and the
packet length. In these experiments, Netcat [7] is used as a proxy between the client
and the server. The delay in the network path is induced with the Netem [31] using
a normal distribution. The Daemonlogger [4] is used to capture packets at the server
side.
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TCP Data Transfer Mode Experiment
In the first experiment, the TG program is generating data using a exponential
distribution with the mean interarrival time of 1ms and the mean packet length of
1500 bytes. In the first phase, the tests are performed without any proxy on the
network path under the following delay conditions.
S
10ms←−→ C (3.1)
In the second test, the delay is increased up to 100ms in order to study a change in
the TCP behavior.
S
100ms←−−→ C (3.2)
In the third test, the delay is increased up to 500ms.
S
500ms←−−→ C (3.3)
In second phase of the first experiment, a proxy system is included in the network
path between the server and the client. The delay between the server and the proxy
system is set to 10ms and delay between the proxy and the client system varies as.
S
10ms←−→ P 10ms←−→ C (3.4)
In the second test, the delay between the proxy and the client system is increased
up to 100ms, in order to study the change in TCP behavior at the server end.
S
10ms←−→ P 100ms←−−→ C (3.5)
In the third test, the delay is increased up to 500ms.
S
10ms←−→ P 500ms←−−→ C (3.6)
In third phase of the first experiment, the delay between the server and the proxy
system is increased up to 100ms. The delay between the proxy and the client system
varies in a similar pattern as in the second phase.
S
100ms←−−→ P 10ms←−→ C (3.7)
In the second test, the delay between proxy and client system is increased up to
100ms, in order to study the change in TCP behavior at the server end.
S
100ms←−−→ P 100ms←−−→ C (3.8)
In the third test, the delay is increased up to 500ms.
S
10oms←−−→ P 500ms←−−→ C (3.9)
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Figure 3.1: Experiment for the TCP data transfer mode under different
delay conditions. The X-axis shows total RTT delay on the connection
from the server to the client system and the Y-axis shows number of
packets.
The number of packets is counted for with/without proxy cases in all three test
phases. The results of the first experiment are shown in Figure 3.1. In Figure 3.1,
the symbols marked as “noproxy” case shows the result from the first phase of ex-
periment. The symbols marked as “proxy (10ms delay)” shows the result from the
second phase and the symbols marked as “proxy (100ms delay)” shows the result
from third phase of the experiment. This terminology remains same in all tests
performed in this chapter.
The results in Figure 3.1 show that the number of packets is either remained al-
most the same or slightly increased, in spite the expectation of their decrease. The
reason for this behavior is almost all segments are filled completely with data of size
equal to MSS of the network path. The slight increase of the number of packets is
due to increase of the number of ACK packets sent by the server upon receiving data.
The similar behavior is noted when the proxy system is present in the network
path. The number of packets either remained almost the same or slightly increased
with an increase in the delay. The main point to note in this experiment is when the
delay between the server and the proxy system is kept same and delay between the
proxy system and the client is increased, the number of packets start to increase.
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However, the increase in the number of packets is not much to make a basis for the
detection of a proxy system in the incoming TCP connection.
TCP Interactive Traffic Type Experiment
The second experiment is conducted to study the TCP behavior with an exponen-
tially distributed size of data packets with mean of 10 bytes. The intuition behind
this experiment is that in the first experiment, almost all segments are of MSS size
and the TCP sender is transmitting data as soon as it received the data from the
user. The Nagle algorithm does not inhibit a sender from sending data if the data
to be sent is of MSS size and the window size is greater than MSS. However, the
Nagle algorithm inhibits a sender from sending small size data packets and makes
the sender to wait for ACK to arrive from the receiver. With an increase in the
delay on a connection, the data will be buffered for longer time and result in arrival
of packets with a larger size at the receiving end.
Figure 3.2: Experiment for the TCP traffic in small packet size mode
under different RTT delay conditions. The X-axis shows total RTT
delay on connection from the server to the client system and the Y-axis
shows the number of packets.
In the second experiment, the TG program is generating data using an expo-
nentially distributed packet size with the mean of 10 bytes. The experiment is
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performed to transfer 10 Kbytes of data.
The second experiment is conducted under the similar delay and proxy condi-
tions as in the first experiment with an exception in the data generation process.
The results from the second experiment are shown in Figure 3.2. From the results, it
is clearly seen that the number of packets are decreased as the delay on a connection
is increased. The reason for such behavior is that the Nagle algorithm inhibits the
client system to send small size data and makes it to wait for ACK to arrive. This
causes data to buffer at the client side and upon ACK arrival, the client sends a
larger size segment. Hence, to transmit the same amount of data the number of
packets is decreased.
In the first phase of this experiment when no proxy is present in the network
path, the number of packets are decreased from 402 to 29 as the delay is increased
from 10ms to 500ms. Similar behavior is seen in the other two phases also, when
the proxy is present in the network path.
In the “proxy (100ms delay)” case, there is no significant decrease in the number
of packets when the delay in the connection between the proxy and the client system
is increased from 10ms to 100ms. The reason behind this behavior is, when delay
between the server and the proxy system is equal or higher than delay between the
proxy and the client system, data at the proxy system will arrive within delay of the
connection between the server and the proxy system. Therefore, the proxy system
will forward data to the server without any further delay. Even if the delay between
the proxy and the client system is increased from 10ms to 100ms, the number of
packets remains the same.
The main result from the above experiment is that when the delay between the
server and the proxy system is kept same, and the delay between the proxy and
the client system is increased, then number of packets start to decrease as the delay
increases. Therefore using the proposed approach it is possible to detect the presence
of a proxy if the rate of data generation at the sender side is known. However, this
is not possible in the real world. The application at the sender side can generate
data at a random rate and can randomly generate more data, which will result in
a larger packet size. The aforementioned approach will result in a false positive for
this case. Besides, growing interest in the encryption usage for communication will
result in a problem for this approach. Different encryption algorithms and keys used
for the encryption will result in arrival of packets with the different length at the
receiving end, and will result in more false positives. Therefore an another approach
is needed which will be independent of packet contents, the packet size and packet
numbers. The new approach should also be applicable to the encrypted traffic.
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3.1.2 The Interarrival Packet Time Approach
The quest of finding a new approach directs all attention to the traffic parameters,
which are independent of encryption. The required parameter turned out to be In-
terarrival Packet Time (IPT). The IPT is a difference between the current arrival
time of incoming packet from the last packet arrival time. The data from previ-
ous experiments is analyzed with different perspective to study IPT values and its
behavior.
TCP Data Mode Experiment
Figure 3.3: Experiment for IPT in TCP data transfer mode for the “no
proxy” case under different RTT delay conditions. The X-axis shows
the time (seconds) and the Y-axis shows the interarrival packet time
under different delay conditions on the logarithmic scale.
Figure 3.3 shows the IPT values from the first phase of the experiment 3.1.1.
There is no proxy present in the network path in this phase of the experiment. The
case with “noproxy 10ms delay“ shows the test without the proxy in the network
path and the delay of 10ms between the server and the client system. The remaining
tests use the same terminology in this chapter.
From the figure, we can see that when delay between the client and the server
is 10ms, almost all packets are arrived within 10ms. In the initial phase of the data
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Figure 3.4: Experiment for IPT in TCP data transfer mode for the
”proxy with 10ms delay“ case under different RTT delay conditions.
The X-axis shows the time (seconds) and the Y-axis shows the inter-
arrival packet time under different delay conditions on the logarithmic
scale.
transfer, TCP at the client system is in the slow start phase. After sending 2-3
packets, it waits for ACK to arrive before sending more data to the server and this
results in a delay at the server end. As the data transfer progresses, the sender
increases its window size and sends more data to the receiver without waiting for
ACK. Therefore, we can see (Figure 3.3) the IPT value of packets starts to decrease.
The other two test cases (when the delay in the network path is 100ms and 500ms)
show the similar behavior.
Figure 3.4 shows IPT values from the second phase of the first experiment 3.1.1.
In this phase, a proxy is present in the network path. In the second phase, the RTT
delay between the server and the proxy system is 10ms and the delay between the
proxy and the client system is varying from 10ms to 500ms. The case in Figure 3.4
with “proxy 10ms-10ms delay“ shows the test when a proxy is present in the network
path and the delay is 10ms between the server and the proxy system, and the delay
in the connection between the proxy and the client system is 10ms. The same
terminology is used in all the remaining tests performed with a proxy.
Consider the case when delay conditions are as
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Figure 3.5: Experiment for IPT in TCP data transfer mode for the
”proxy with 100ms delay“ case under different RTT delay conditions.
The X-axis shows the time (seconds) and the Y-axis shows the inter-
arrival packet time under different delay conditions on the logarithmic
scale.
S
10ms←−→ P 100ms←−−→ C (3.10)
The result shows that the packets start to arrive after 100ms delay, even though de-
lay between the server and the proxy system is 10ms. The reason for this behavior is
the small initial window size at the client system. After sending 2-3 data packets to
the proxy system, the client waits for ACK to arrive before sending more data. The
proxy system sends ACK back to the client and forwards received data to the server.
After receiving ACK from the proxy system, the client increases its window size and
sends more data to the proxy system. The new data segments arrive at the proxy
system after one complete RTT delay in the connection between the proxy and the
client system. The proxy system then forwards received data to the server. At the
server side, this delay results in a delay equal to delay on the connection between the
proxy and the client. As the data transfer progress, window size at the client side
increases and allows the client to send more data without any further wait for ACK.
This causes the IPT values to decrease as seen in Figure 3.4. The same behavior
is noted when the delay between the proxy and the client system is 10ms and 500ms.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the result from the third phase of the experiment. In the
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third phase, the RTT delay between the server and the proxy system is 100ms and
the delay between the proxy and the client system is varying from 10ms to 500ms.
The figure illustrates that the packets start to arrive after the 100ms delay, which
is the delay between the server and the proxy system. When the delay between
the proxy and the client system increases up to 500ms, the packets start to arrive
after 500ms. As the window size starts to increase, IPT at the server side starts to
decrease. When the delay between the proxy and the client system increases from
10ms to 100ms, the packets still arrive after 100ms. Because data arrived at the
proxy system within 100ms delay which is equal to the delay between the server and
the proxy system.
Therefore if the delay in a connection between the server and the proxy system
is equal or higher than the delay in a connection between the proxy and the client
system, then it is not possible to detect the presence of a proxy system in the network
path.
TCP Interactive Traffic Type Experiment
Figure 3.6: Experiment for TCP small packet size traffic with the ”no
proxy“ case under different RTT delay conditions.The X-axis shows the
time (seconds) and the Y-axis shows the interarrival packet time under
different delay conditions on the logarithmic scale.
The similar analysis of IPT values is performed on the data from the second
experiment. The result in Figure 3.6 shows the IPT values from the first phase of
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Figure 3.7: Experiment for TCP small packet size traffic for the ”proxy
with 10ms delay“ case under different RTT delay conditions.The X-axis
shows the time (seconds) and the Y-axis shows the interarrival packet
time under different delay conditions on the logarithmic scale.
the second experiment. From result, we have seen that the packets arrived at the
server side with in corresponding delay on the connection between the server and
the proxy system. The main difference between the results obtained in first phase of
the second experiment from the first experiment is the almost all the packets arrive
after 10ms second delay. The IPT values do not decrease with the increase in the
window size. In the second experiment, the application is generating small size data
and due to small size packets, the Nagle algorithm inhibits the client system to wait
for ACK to arrive before sending more data. The Nagle algorithm inhibits a sender
from sending the data if the data to be sent are less than MSS in the network path.
This causes a delay in the data arrival at the server end and causes average packet
length to increase from 10 bytes to 48 bytes in the 10ms delay case. The similar
behavior is seen for 100ms and 500ms cases.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the result from second phase of the second experiment. The
delay between the server and the proxy system is 10ms and delay between the proxy
and the client system varies from 10ms to 500ms. From the result, it is observed
that when delay between the proxy and the client system is 100ms, the packets ar-
rived after 100ms delay at the server end even though the delay between the server
and the proxy system is 10ms. The same behavior is seen for the 500ms case and
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Figure 3.8: Experiment for TCP small packet size traffic for the ”proxy
with 10ms delay“ case under different RTT delay conditions. The X-
axis shows the time (seconds) and the Y-axis shows the interarrival
packet time under different delay conditions on the logarithmic scale.
the value of IPT remains the same during the complete session compared to the
first experiment where IPT starts to decrease due to increase in the window size.
This is because the available data size in not equal to MSS size on the network path.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the result from third phase of the second experiment. The
delay between the server and the proxy system is 100ms and delay between the
proxy and the client system varies from 10ms to 500ms. From the result it can be
seen that the packets start to arrive after 100ms at the server end, when delay be-
tween the proxy and the client system is 10ms or 100ms. This is because the data at
the proxy system arrived within 100ms delay and the proxy forwards data without
any further delay. However, as delay between the proxy and the client system is
increased up to 500ms, the packets start to arrive after 500ms delay at the server side.
The results of IPT values obtained from the two experiments show that by
monitoring the IPT values at the receiver end, it is possible to detect whether the
peer communicating is a real originator of the connection or acting as a proxy in
the connection. The detection is possible when delay between the receiver system
and the peer communicating with it is less compared to a delay between the peer
and the sender system.
29
3. THE TECHNICAL APPROACH AND SYSTEM MODEL
3.2 The System Model
3.2.1 System Description
When a user connects from a local host H0 to a remote host H1 using TCP as
a transport protocol, it establishes a TCP connection C1 between the hosts H0
and H1. If the user connects to an another remote host using the host H1 to a
remote host H2, it results in the establishment of another TCP connection C2.
Thus following the same procedure he successively connects to H3, H4,....., Hn by
establishing the connections C3, C4,......, Cn on each link between the hosts. This
sequence of connections C = 〈 C1, C2,....., Cn 〉 is called a connection chain. The
TCP connection Ci is a connection between the host Hi−1 and the host Hi. Each
connection Ci has its own RTT delay ti between host Hi−1 and Hi.
Problem Statement: Given a TCP connection Ci between a host Hi−1 and
a host Hi with RTT delay ti, find out at the receiving host Hi whether the host Hi−1
is a real originator of the connection or it is merely acting as an intermediary host
in the connection chain.
Figure 3.9: Problem Statement
3.2.2 Conditions
To solve the given problem 3.9, the proposed approach takes in account of Interar-
rival packet time of the incoming packets from the sender at the receiving end. The
detection approach considers incoming packets with the packet size greater than
zero. In order to apply the given approach to the encrypted communication and the
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concerns about privacy issues, the approach does not take into account the packet
contents and the packet size. The packet size can be changed to bypass the detec-
tion procedure and in the encrypted communication, the packet size differs due to
different key sizes used for the encryption.
3.2.3 The Given Approach
The packets are coming at the receiving end with independently distributed inter-
arrival packet time from a source. Consider a count process Z = {Zi}i=0,1,2,... that
monitors the interarrival packet time during the ith time interval at the receiving
end. Each time interval is a bin of width b, where the value of b depends upon type
of the connection being monitored. For an interactive connection type:
b = Avg. typing speed(TS) +RTT +Host load factor(H) (3.11)
whereas in a data bursts connection type:
b = RTT +Host load factor(H) (3.12)
The RTT is the Round Trip Time delay of the connection between the hosts and
Host load factor (H) is a parameter that correspond to a delay caused by the system
load to respond a request. The incoming packet size should be greater than zero
to be counted in the counting process Z. For a given ith interval Z
(b)
i can be, Z
(b)
i
= 0 or Z
(b)
i > 0. The former case is known as a empty bin and later is known as
a occupied bin. For j ≥ i, the Z(b)i,..,j is called as a burst if for all k, i ≤ k ≤ j, the
bins are occupied and similarly Z
(b)
i,..,j is called as alull if the correspondingly bins
are empty.
We are interested in the size of lulls. The size of a lull specifies the amount of
period in which no packets have arrived from the sender. If the size of lull is greater
than a specified threshold value, it means a break in typing the keystrokes by the
user during remote login session. Whereas in data bursts case this is not possible
under the normal network conditions and should not happen. If the size of a lull
is less than a specified threshold value then the occurrence of such a lull during the
connection is a sign of suspicion. In order to have high confidence and a low false
positive rate, the intrusion detection system should wait for more occurrences of
such lulls and then raise a warning, and mark the connection as a possible connec-
tion using the intermediary hosts.
There is a probability that lulls may occur due to congestion on the network
path. To avoid this and decrease the probability of false positives, another count
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process Y = {Yi}i=0,1,2,... can be considered which counts the number of ACK pack-
ets arriving from the sender with the TCP segment size equal to zero. If the number
of events in the process Y has been increased since the occurrence of recent lulls in
the process Z, then the occurrence of lulls is unlikely to occur due to congestion.
Because arrival of ACK packets from the sender signify the lack of congestion in the
network path.
The RTT delay of the connection can be measured by different methods. In [19],
authors suggested different methods to calculate the RTT delay of a connection
with their benefits and shortcomings. In the present thesis work, the RTT delay is
calculated during initial handshake between the sender and the receiver. As this is
calculated immediately after the client made a request and the detection process is
started in the early stage. The value of threshold for the lulls length can be tuned
by the administrator according to his/her requirements. From the experiments per-
formed in this thesis work, the value of threshold equal to 1.5 secs is found to be
adequate.
The application protocols have their own traffic characteristics. In [40], the
author has described empirically driven analytical models of a TCP connection un-
der the different application protocols. In [40], the author has studied mainly the
amount of bytes transfered between the server and the client and their resemblance
with the various distributions. However, the author has not studied the interarrival
packet time characteristics for the different application protocols. In [42], authors
have studied the interarrival packet time of Telnet protocol using the Pareto distri-
bution. But except the [42], no other literature has been found which discuss the
interarrival packet time distribution for the different application protocols.
The problem in using the Pareto distribution for other application protocols is
the lack of its parameters values. The value of shape parameter (β) for Telnet
protocol is given in [42], but for the other application protocols no such values are
provided. Therefore, due to lack of the available literature and limited time, making
a complete system model is not possible in the present thesis work.
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“Accept what cannot
be changed, change
what cannot be accepted.”
Harbhajan Singh 4
The Remote Login Protocols
4.1 SSH Protocol
The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol allows exchange of data in a secure way over an
insecure network. The SSH protocol was designed for a replacement of insecure
remote login protocols such as telnet and rlogin. The SSH protocol consists of three
main components [55]: Transport Layer Protocol, User Authentication Protocol and
Connection Protocol. The transport layer protocol provides server authentication,
confidentiality and integrity. The SSH transport layer protocol typically runs over
TCP/IP. The user authentication protocol authenticates the client-side user to the
server and runs over SSH transport layer protocol. The connection protocol multi-
plexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels and provides a wide range
of services on a single tunnel.
4.1.1 SSH Experiment using Typing
The motivation for the experiment is to detect the use of intermediary hosts in an
incoming connection request at the receiver end. The attacker usually logs in to
a number of intermediary hosts called stepping stones before launching an attack
at the victim system. The chain of stepping-stones helps him to hide his real IP
address and remains anonymous on the network. The intuition for this experiment
is that an attacker types command characters from his local system and this com-
mand characters travel from attacker system to the victim system via a chain of
intermediary hosts. The journey of characters from attacker system to the victim
system will result in a higher delay compared to the arrival of characters from last
intermediary host in the chain.
The SSH experiment is conducted with three computer systems. The system S
is acting as a SSH server, the system P is acting as a proxy system and the system
C is acting as a SSH client system. The attacker is located at the client C. The
proxy system P can act either as a SSH server for the client C and a SSH client for
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the server S or as a generic TCP proxy using netcat. To imitate the user typing
expect [36] scripts to provide reproducibility in all the performed experiments. The
delay in typing each command character has been similar to an advance computer
user, such as a hacker. The experiment uses the following command set.
 pwd
 ls -l
 who
 cd Public
 ls -l
 more g
 exit
The experiment is conducted in two phases. In first phase of the experiment, proxy
system P is working as a SSH server for the client C and a SSH client for the server
S. The proxy system P is not present during first test and the network conditions
are as
S
10ms←−→ C (4.1)
Now a proxy system is included in the network path between server S and client C.
The network conditions on the path are as
S
10ms←−→ P 250ms←−−→ C (4.2)
In third test, the connection has delay up to 500ms on the connection between proxy
P and client C is increased.
S
10ms←−→ P 500ms←−−→ C (4.3)
The Figure 4.1 shows result from this phase of the experiment. The Figure illus-
trates the IPT of incoming request packets from the sender. The result shows the
IPT values only for packets encrypted with the current session key. These encrypted
packets include username, password and the command characters.
In second phase of the experiment, the proxy system P is acting as a TCP generic
proxy. The network condition and command script used in this phase is similar to
the first phase of the experiment. The Figure 4.2 illustrates result from this phase.
In this phase, the result shows IPT values for key exchange packets and encrypted
packets coming from the sender.
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Figure 4.1: SSH test conducted under different network conditions with
SSH protocol as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time (sec) and the Y-axis
shows the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
Analysis and Discussion
In first phase of the experiment, the proxy system is acting as a SSH server for the
client C and a SSH client for the server S. The attacker using the proxy P initiates
a connection towards the server S. From figure 4.1, we see that during initial time
period from 0-1 sec, the packets arrived after approximately 10ms at the server end
in all three test cases. These packets belong to the session key setup phase and
are triggered by the SSH transport layer [56] protocol. After establishment of the
session key, attacker types in a username and a password to log in to the server S.
After successful login, the server S opens requested service and the attacker gets the
command prompt.
In Figure 4.1 near the period of 5 secs, the first command (pwd) character packet
arrives for testcase 4.1. The remaining command packets arrive with IPT value of
approx. 200ms, 200ms and 100ms correspondingly. In the test cases [4.2,4.3], the
first command character arrives after higher delay compared to the testcase 4.1, but
the IPT of all the remaining characters in the command is almost similar to the
testcase 4.1. The arrival time of all the remaining command packets shows similar
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Figure 4.2: SSH test conducted under different network conditions with
netcat as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time (sec) and the Y-axis shows
the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
behavior.
From the above result, we can say that the difference between IPT values from
all the three test cases is not significant to make a decision about presence of a proxy
system in the connection.
In second phase of the experiment, the netcat is working as a generic TCP proxy
and the SSH session is setup between the client C and the server S. We can see that
in testcase 4.1, the packets for key exchange arrive after 10ms or slightly higher.
When the proxy P is included in the connection, the initial phase packets start to
arrive according to delay on the connection between server S and client C. Therefore,
the initial packets arrive at the server in testcase 4.2 after 250ms or slightly higher
and in the testcase 4.3 after 500ms or slightly higher. Except the change in initial
behavior, all the remaining behavior is similar to first phase of the experiment. The
IPT values of the command packets result in a similar value in second phase also
for all the three test cases.
The reason behind the same values of IPT for command packets is the SSH con-
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nection protocol. The SSH connection protocol specifies the SSH MSG CHANNEL
WINDOW ADJUST (window size) [54] in bytes during channel setup. The win-
dow size tells how much bytes other party can send before it must wait to adjust the
window. This value of window size is different for the different SSH implementation.
For example in OpenSSH 5.1p1 the value is three, after sending three packets the
sender waits for a response from receiver before sending more data. This wait can
result in a higher delay if the delay on any connection in the connection chain is
higher enough to make the distinction noticeable.
4.1.2 SSH Experiment using Script
The motivation for this experiment is that the attackers not always type command
characters from their own systems. They can run the script from their system and
launch an attack on the victim. The intuition behind this experiment is that when
the execution of a command is completed, the result will travel up to an attacker
system via chain of stepping-stones. On arrival of the execution result, the attacker
will send next command that will travel from the attacker system to victim system
via the same stepping-stones. The delay in arrival of the next command will always
be equal or higher to total delay on the connection between attacker system and
the victim system. Therefore, the difference in delay for arrival of next command is
noticeable at the victim side and detection about presence of a proxy is possible in
the connection.
This experiment is conducted using the same network conditions and command
set as used in section 4.1.1. The script used for the commands has no typing delay
and each request packet from the client C carries a complete command instead of
a single command character. The experiment is conducted in two phases similar
to the section 4.1.1. In first phase the SSH protocol is working as a proxy and in
second phase the netcat acts as a generic TCP proxy.
The figure 4.3 shows the result from first phase of the experiment. The Figure
illustrates the IPT of incoming request packets from the sender. The next phase
of the experiment uses netcat as a proxy and same command script and network
conditions to perform the tests. The figure 4.4 illustrates result from this phase
of the experiment. The second phase shows the IPT values for key exchange and
encrypted packets coming from the sender.
Analysis and Discussion
In first phase of the experiment, the SSH protocol is working as a proxy and a SSH
session is established between server S and the peer (P or C). From figure 4.3 we
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Figure 4.3: SSH test conducted using script under different network
conditions with SSH protocol as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time (sec)
and the Y-axis shows the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
can see that during the initial time period of 0-1 sec, the packets from all the three
test cases arrive after 10ms delay or so. After the session key is established, we can
see that the username, password and command packets arrive after different IPT
values. The IPT values for each packets after the initial setup is corresponding to
the delay between server S and client C.
The reason behind this behavior is that the result of last given command travels
from the server S to client C and upon receiving the result, the client C sends a
next command. The next command arrives at server after covering the complete
path from client C to server S. Therefore journey of the result from last command
and the next given command results in one complete RTT delay of the connection
between server S and client C.
In second phase of the experiment, the netcat is working as a generic TCP proxy
and the client C establishes a SSH session directly with server S. This will result
in IPT values of initial key exchange packets equal to the delay between server S
and client C. After the successful SSH session setup username, password and the
command packets arrive with different IPT values at the server side under different
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Figure 4.4: SSH test conducted using script under different network
conditions with netcat as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time (sec) and
the Y-axis shows the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
network delay conditions.
In second phase, the username and password at server S arrives after total delay
on the connection between server S and client C. This behavior is seen in all the
three test cases during the second phase. However, the command packets in proxy
case arrive after twice as much as delay on the connection between server S and
client C. This behavior is seen in both the test cases 4.2,4.3. The reason behind
this behavior is nagle algorithm inhibits the proxy system from sending small size
segments to client and makes it to wait for an ACK to arrive from the client. The
reason for occurrence of this behavior is the use of netcat as TCP proxy. In the
first phase SSH sets the window size bigger and avoids this wait, and result in delay
equal or slightly higher than RTT delay on the connection between server S and
client C.
From the results obtained in second experiments, we can detect the presence
of proxy with confidence by monitoring the IPT value of request packets from the
client. The decision about use of script by client can be made by monitoring the
number of reply packets sent by server in response to single request packet. Either
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to avoid the detection, the attacker can send the command characters one by one
without any delay or he can run script from the last intermediary host. In former
case, the window size will make client to wait and result in delay of packet arrival
at the server S. In later case, the script run from last intermediary host will result
in a communication pattern similar to a legitimate case, and therefore detection is
not possible.
The conclusion from SSH protocol experiments is that the detection about pres-
ence of a proxy system in the incoming connection is possible in two cases. First if
an attacker uses generic TCP proxy to relay his attack, then detection is possible in
early phase during session establishment. The user typing speed is a main variable
and need to choose carefully to detect the proxy. To detect the presence of a proxy
system in a connection under OpenSSH, the following equation must satisfy.
4 ∗ x < d (4.4)
Where x is average typing speed/character (msec) of a user and d is a delay on
any connection in the connection chain up to last intermediary host. Secondly if
an attacker uses a script to launch an attack, then the script should run from his
own system or any other proxy system on the path between attacker system and the
second last proxy system. In other cases, it is not possible to detect the presence of
proxy system in an incoming connection due to the SSH custom window size.
4.1.3 The Approach Implementation for SSH Protocol
To implement the given approach for detection of a proxy system in an incoming
SSH connection, the Bro [41] intrusion detection system is used. The code is written
in a script file used by Bro to detect network based attacks. The script can detect
presence of a generic TCP proxy system in an incoming SSH connection. The com-
plete source code is given in Appendix A.1
In Bro, the events are generated when a packet arrives at the server. There
are different kinds of events e.g. new packet, connection established, login success
etc [3]. The script files are used as the policies, which tells Bro to register the
analyzer to analyze an event of interest. The round trip time of the every TCP
connection is calculated during 3-way handshake and stored in a table with corre-
sponding connectoin ID. This is performed by making a addition in a connection
script “conn.bro“ provided with the Bro. The patch is provided for the modifica-
tions done in ”conn.bro”.
When a new TCP connection is established with the server, the script checks
each newly established connection whether it is either a SSH connection (port 22)
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or any other connection. If it is a SSH connection then the script start to monitor
IPT values of incoming packets with packet size greater than zero. The value of
connection’s RTT delay is fetched from the conn.bro.One more factor corresponds
to Host overload factor is added in to RTT delay. This factor is to take in account
a delay caused by work load at the host in responding to a request. The RTT delay
condition against which the IPT values are checked is calculated as.
session$rtt = connection_rtt(c$id);
if (session$rtt > .05sec)
session$rtt_cond = session$rtt*1.25;
else
session$rtt_cond = session$rtt*2.5;
The scripts monitors some initial incoming packets, which belong to the key ex-
change and session setup phase. After recording the IPT values of these packets,
the average of recorded IPT values is calculated.
if(session$avg_t > session$rtt_cond)
{
print proxy_file, fmt ("%.6f: #%s Proxy Connection %s", \
network_time(), prefixed_id(session$id), \
id_string(c$id));
session$alarmp = T;
}
If the average IPT value is higher than session$rtt cond then a warning is logged in
to a file named proxy.log. The script is tested on captured files from the experiment
using command as.
sudo bro -r ssh_10ms_500ms_nwproxy.pcap -r ssh_script_10ms_250ms_
nwproxy.pcap -r ssh_10_250ms_proxy.pcap -r ssh_10ms
_noproxy.pcap ssh-proxy
The result obbtained from the above test on captured files is logged in to proxy.log.
The entry logged into proxy.log file shows information about the proxy connection.
Each line in the logged entry shows the time on which a connection is marked as a
proxy connection. It shows the session ID for that specific session and records IP
address of the client with port number used to connect at the SSH server.
1243445742.177616: #2 Proxy Connection 129.241.208.54/43945
> 129.241.208.186/ssh
1243448437.259864: #3 Proxy Connection 129.241.208.54/45000
> 129.241.208.186/ssh
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4.2 Telnet Protocol
The Telnet protocol provides access to a command-line interface of a remote host
using a virtual terminal connection over the TCP protocol. The telnet is available
for all the current available operating systems. Due to lack of security features,
the use of telnet has been stopped for remote access. However, some users still
use it due to its widespread availability. The telnet is also used in debugging of
network services such as SMTP, HTTP or POP3 to issue commands and examine
the responses.
4.2.1 Telnet Experiment using Typing
The motivation for telnet experiment is to detect the use of intermediary hosts in
an incoming connection at the receiver end. However, the telnet is not much in use
for remote access, but its behavior is similar to any custom built protocol by an at-
tacker to interact with the bots or to send commands to the bots in his botnet. The
study of telnet behavior under different delay conditions helps in detecting the use of
intermediary hosts in their command and control network. Also the lack of security
features makes it vulnerable to man in the middle attack and using this study it
can be possible to detect such attack. The intuition behind the telnet experiment
is similar to SSH experiment. In a connection chain, the journey of command char-
acters from the attacker system will result in a higher delay at the victim system
compare to delay in arrival of characters from the last intermediary host in the chain.
The telnet experiment is conducted with the three computer systems. The sys-
tem S is acting as a telnet server, the system P is acting as a proxy system and the
system C is acting as a telnet client. The attacker is located at the client system.
The proxy system P can act as either a telnet server for client C or telnet client for
server S or as a generic TCP proxy using netcat. The command set used in telnet
experiments is similar to SSH experiments. The delay in typing command character
is kept similar to the SSH experiment. The telnet experiment is conducted in two
phases.
In first phase, the proxy system is acting as a telnet server for client C and
telnet client for server S. During the first test, there is no proxy on the network path
between client C and server S. The delay condition on a connection between client
C and server S is as shown below.
S
10ms←−→ C (4.5)
Now a proxy system is included on the path between server S and client C. The
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network conditions on the path are as
S
10ms←−→ P 250ms←−−→ C (4.6)
In third test, the delay on a connection between proxy P and client C is increased
up to 500ms.
S
10ms←−→ P 500ms←−−→ C (4.7)
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Figure 4.5: Telnet test conducted under different network conditions
with telnet protocol as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time (sec) and the
Y-axis shows the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
The Figure 4.5 illustrates result from first phase of the experiment. The figure
shows the IPT of incoming request packets from the peer system (P or C) with size
greater than zero. These packets belong to telnet session negotiation, username,
password and command characters.
In second phase of the experiment, the proxy system P is acting as a generic
TCP proxy between client C and server S. The telnet session is setup between client
C and server S. The network delay conditions and command set is similar to the
first phase. The script used in the test to type command characters has the similar
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delay as in the first phase. The result from second phase of the experiment is shown
in Figure 4.6. The figure illustrates the packets from the peer system (P or C) with
size greater than zero.
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Figure 4.6: Telnet test conducted under different network conditions
with netcat as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time (sec) and the Y-axis
shows the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
Analysis and Discussion
The result from telnet protocol experiment shows that the IPT values of incoming
request packets is distinguishable in all three different test cases. In first phase of
the experiment, the telnet session is setup between the server S and the peer system
(P or C). The packets belong to session negotiation arrived at the sender around
same time in all three test cases. From figure 4.5, we see that the packets belong to
command characters arrived at different IPT values in all three test cases consider-
ing the delay in typing the characters is same. We see that the command packets
in testcase 4.6 always arrived after delay of 250ms or more. The same behavior is
seen in the testcase 4.7, where packets arrived after 500ms or higher.
In second phase of the experiment, the session is setup between the client C and
the server S. This results in arrival of the session negotiation packets after total delay
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on the connection between client C and server S. Therefore monitoring IPT values
of the incoming packets and comparing it with delay on the connection between
server S and the peer communicating with it (P or C), a decision about presence of
proxy can be made. When a TCP generic proxy is used the decision about proxy
presence can be made in earlier phase compared to the case when telnet protocol is
used as a proxy. The command packets arrived in a similar behavior as seen in the
first phase and result in distinct behavior under different test cases.
The reason behind the distinct values of command packets in different test cases
is that in telnet protocol, the client waits for a reply to come from the server be-
fore sending another data packet. In telnet protocol the size of request packet is
small(1 byte/character) and the Nagle algorithm inhibits client system from send-
ing next packet before receiving an ACK from the peer (P or S). The client system
will buffer the command characters and send them together upon arrival of ACK
packet. The wait in sending data at the client side results in delay equal to an RTT
delay on the connection chain up to the server. From figures 4.5 and 4.6, we can see
that packet numbers are also less in test case 4.7 for same command compared to
other test cases which signifies the buffering of command character at the client side.
4.2.2 Telnet Experiment using Script
The telnet experiment using script is performed with a motivation to study the IPT
behavior in case of script used by an attacker to launch an attack. The intuition
behind this test is similar to section 4.1.2. The next command from attacker will
arrive after total RTT delay on the connection between an attacker and the victim
system.
The experiment is conducted using the network delay conditions and command
set similar to experiment in section 4.2.1. The script used to send commands has no
typing delay and each request packet from the attacker carries complete command
in spite of single command character. The experiment is conducted in two phases
similar to the first experiment under telnet protocol.
In first phase telnet protocol is acting as a proxy. The result from first phase
of the experiment is shown in figure 4.7. The figure illustrates the IPT of incoming
request packets from the peer (P or C) with packet size greater than zero.
In second phase of the experiment, the netcat is used as a TCP generic proxy.
The result from second phase of experiment is shown in figure 4.8. The figure shows
IPT of the incoming request packets from the peer (P or C) in all three different
45
4. THE REMOTE LOGIN PROTOCOLS
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 0  2  4  6  8  10
In
te
r a
rri
va
l p
ac
ke
t t
im
e 
(m
se
c)
Time (sec)
No Proxy with 10ms delay
 Telnet as Proxy with 10ms and 250ms delay
 Telnet as Proxy with 10ms and 500ms 
Figure 4.7: Telnet test conducted using script under different network
conditions with telnet protocol as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time
(sec) and the Y-axis shows the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log
scale.
network conditions. The packets belong to telnet session negotiation, username,
password and commands.
Analysis and Discussion
In first phase of the experiment, the Telnet protocol works as a proxy and session
is setup between the proxy P and the server S in test case 4.6 and 4.7. From fig-
ure 4.7 we can observe that in the initial period of 0-1 sec, the session setup packets
arrive with approximately 10ms delay in all the three test cases. After the session is
established, packets from the peer (P or C) arrive after the corresponding delay on
the connection between server S and client C in all the three test cases. The IPT
values of incoming packets from the peer is either equals or higher than the delay
on connection between server S and client C.
The explanation for the shown behavior is the result from last given command
travels from the server S to client C and upon receiving the result, client C sends a
next command. The next command arrives at the server after travelling complete
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Figure 4.8: Telnet test conducted using script under different network
conditions with netcat as a proxy. The X-axis shows Time (sec) and
the Y-axis shows the inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
path from client to server via proxies in the path and results in delay equal or higher
to the RTT on the connection between server S and client C. From figure 4.7, we
see that command packets in test case 4.6 and 4.7 arrives after almost two times
the delay on the connection between server S and client C. The reason is the nagle
algorithm inhibits proxy system from sending small size reply packets form server
back to the client and waits for an ACK to arrive from client. This wait couples
with delay in arrival of the next command from client at proxy and results in almost
twice as much as RTT delay on the connection.
In second phase of the experiment, the netcat acts as a TCP generic proxy and
telnet session is established between the server S and the client C. From figure 4.8,
we can see that the packets from session negotiation arrive with different IPT values
in all three test cases. Except this difference, the result in second phase is similar
to first phase of the experiment.
The conclusion from telnet protocol test is that an incoming connection can be
distinguished from a connection coming via some proxies or a connection coming
directly from sender at the receiver end. The nagle algorithm couples with allowed
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window size results in a wait at the sender side. The wait causes a delay equal to
maximum delay on any connection in the connection chain. The user average typing
speed per character must satisfy the following equation for detection to happen when
telnet protocol is used as a proxy.
2 ∗ x < d (4.8)
Where x is average typing speed/character and d is delay on any connection in the
connection chain up to last proxy system.
4.2.3 The Approach Implementation for Telnet Protocol
The implementation of proposed approach is performed in a script file named ”telnet-
proxy.bro”. This file can be loaded in to the Bro to start monitoring the incom-
ing Telnet connections. The complete source code of telnet script is given in Ap-
pendix A.2. The script is monitoring the event connection established and
checks whether the newly established connection is a telnet or any other connection.
If it is a telnet connection then the script makes a new copy of session record to
store the information related to this session. The information for all the current
sessions is store in a table named ”telnet sessions”.
The Telnet script performs detection of a proxy system in the two phases. In first
phase, the script tries to detect the presence of a generic TCP proxy in an incoming
Telnet connection. This phase monitors 4 initial incoming packets and compares the
average of IPT value against session$rtt cond. If the average is higher than the
rtt condition then a warning is raised. The reason for choosing only 4 initial packet
is based on number of packets used by the Telnet to negotiate the session options. If
the session is setup between the server and the peer (Proxy or client system), then
the detection from this phase is not possible.
If the first phase is not able to detect the proxy system then second phase starts
working after the login is successful. In second phase the session$rtt cond is
calculated as.
session$rtt = connection_rtt(c$id);
if (session$rtt > .05sec)
session$rtt_cond = type_speed + (session$rtt*1.25);
else
session$rtt_cond = type_speed + (session$rtt*2);
The type speed varaiable specifies the user’s avg. typing speed (msec) per char-
acter. This variable can be tuned to optimize the detection process. During the
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experiments performed, the value of 250 msec is found adequate. The script moni-
tors the incoming connection either for first 10 command packets or for a duration
of 90 sec in case of number of incoming command packets are less. The IPT value
of incoming packets is stored and the average is taken after one of the mentioned
condition is satisfied. If the average found higher than the session$rtt cond, then
a warning is logged in to the file named proxy.log. To test the script, it is run on
the captured files using Bro as follows.
sudo bro -r telnet_10_500ms_nwproxy.pcap -r telnet_10ms_noproxy.pcap
-r telnet_10_250ms_nwproxy.pcap -r telnet_10_250ms_proxy.pcap
-r telnet_10ms_500ms_proxy.pcap telnet-proxy
After running the script on these captured files, the warning is logged in to proxy.log.
Each line in the logged entry shows time on which a connection is marked as a proxy
connection. It shows the session ID for that specific session and logs IP address of
the client with port number used to connect at the Telnet server.
1243446985.816970: #1 Proxy Connection using generic TCP proxy
129.241.208.54/55828 > 129.241.208.186/telnet
1243447096.503351: #2 Proxy Connection using generic TCP proxy
129.241.208.54/55831 > 129.241.208.186/telnet
1243446734.365517: #3 Proxy Connection 129.241.208.54/54042
> 129.241.208.186/telnet
1243447927.985351: #4 Proxy Connection 129.241.208.54/49747
> 129.241.208.186/telnet
4.3 Application to Manual Intrusion Detection
The possible application for the experiments performed to study remote login proto-
cols is the Manual intrusion detection. The attackers generally launch their attacks
after logging in to a chain of stepping stones to avoid the possibility of being traced
and get punished. If during an active communication session, the presence of a proxy
system can be detected then a warning will be raised and according to organization
policies an administrator can either closely monitor the connection or terminate it.
In remote login protocols, the main variable in decision about pthe resence of a
proxy system is the user’s average typing speed per character. The average typing
speed of a user can cause high false positive rate if sets too small and high false
negative rate if sets too high.
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“Vision without action
is empty. Action without
vision is blind.”
Yasuhiko Kimura 5
The FTP and HTTP Protocols
5.1 FTP Protocol
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is designed to provide file sharing among the
hosts on a network. The FTP protocol hides the underlying file systems variations
among the hosts and provides a reliable and efficient data transfer among them. The
FTP protocol uses two different connections to provide the required functionality.
The FTP client initiates a connection with the FTP server on port 21, where server
listens for the commands from a client and executes them. After the execution of
a given command, the result is transferred to the FTP client using FTP-data port
(default 20) of the server.
5.1.1 FTP-Control Protocol Experiment
The motivation for a FTP experiment is to detect the use of any proxy system in
the incoming FTP connection at the server. The attacker can use the proxy sys-
tem to setup a FTP connection with the server and can upload any malicious file.
Moreover, the FTP is one of the widely used protocols to transfer files among the
computers on a network. Therefore, it is worth to study its behavior in presence of
a proxy system in the path and check the possibility of detection.
In this experiment, four computer systems are used under the different network
conditions. The command set consists of five commands. The commands are “ls,
cd dirname, ls, put filename and exit”. During the experiment, a file is uploaded at
the FTP server and complete session is captured in a trace file at the server side. At
the proxy system, a FTP proxy (ftp.proxy tool) is running to relay the connection
from a client to a server. In first test case, a direct FTP connection is setup between
the FTP client and the FTP server with 10 ms delay on the connection.
S
10ms←−→ C (5.1)
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After the successful login above mentioned command set is run in corresponding
order and packets are captured for the session at the server end. After this, a proxy
system is introduced under network delay conditions as.
S
10ms←−→ P 250ms←−−→ C (5.2)
The client C makes a request to proxy P and the proxy forwards connection request
to the server S. After the successful login, above mentioned commands are run and
packets are captured at the server side. The same experiment is done under different
delay conditions as
S
10ms←−→ P 500ms←−−→ C (5.3)
Now one more proxy system is introduced in the connection chain with FTP proxy
running on it. The delay on connection chain is as shown below.
S
10ms←−→ P2 300ms←−−→ P1 250ms←−−→ C (5.4)
After successful login to the server S, the same command set is run and packets are
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Figure 5.1: FTP-Control connection test result. The X-axis as time
(sec) and the Y-axis as interarrival time (msec) of ftp command packets
on log scale.
captured at the server side. The main emphasis is on the interarrival packet time of
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FTP command packets. The Figure 5.1 illustrates result of interarrival packet time
of the FTP command packets under the different test conditions. In Figure 5.1,
the result marked as ”Noproxy 10ms delay” shows result from the test case 5.1 and
result marked as ”Proxy with 10 ms and 250ms delay” shows result from the test
case 5.2. The similar notation terminology is used in the tests performed in this
experiment.
Analysis and Discussion
From the figure 5.1, we see the distinct behavior at the server side under different
network conditions. The initial phase in all the test cases results in almost same
IPT values of the incoming packets. These packets belong to the session setup and
user authentication phase. The reason for the similar value of IPT is the use of an
application level proxy for the FTP client.
After successful authentication, the attacker starts to send commands. In FTP
protocol, the commands are not sent character by character as seen in SSH or Tel-
net. In FTP, the complete command arrives at the server S, after the attacker hit
enter key at the client C. In FTP protocol, a different connection is setup between
the server S and the peer (P or C) to transfer the response data of a given com-
mand. To establish a new connection to transfer data, the client C sends a port
number on which it will listen for the incoming connection request from the server S.
Consider an example of first command “ls“ in which the server has to transfer
a list of directories and files in the present directory. After receiving the command,
the FTP client sends a PORT [44] request to the server S with a given port num-
ber on which it is listening for the data connection. The server S sends a response
suggesting that the PORT command is successful. The given response travels the
complete path from the server S to the client C via, if any, proxies present in the
network path. The client upon receiving successful response (code 200) sends the
actual command LIST (in given case). Therefore, the LIST command arrives at the
server after the total delay of connection between the server S and the client C and
results in a noticeable difference under different network conditions.
In the test case 5.1, we see that in ”ls” command case, PORT request arrives
after 1.5 sec and then the command LIST arrive after .038 msec. The reason is that
the command LIST arrives with an ACK packet after 10ms delay, which is a delay
between the server S and the client C in test case 5.1. Consider the test case 5.3,
we see that the PORT request packet arrives after 2.8 sec and the command LIST
arrives after 500msec delay, which is a delay between the proxy P and the client C.
The similar behavior is seen in all other command packets.
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In the test case 5.4, there are two proxy systems are included in the path. After
successful execution of the PORT command, the LIST command arrives after 590ms
which is slightly higher than the delay between server S and client C. The slightly
higher value of IPT than the total delay of connection between the server S and the
client C is due to the additional delay caused by the system load. Thus monitoring
IPT values of the FTP command requests, a decision can be made about presence
of a proxy system in the incoming FTP connection at the receiving end. The ACK
packet arrives at the server side after the delay on connection between the server S
and the peer (P or C). This signifies the lack of congestion on the network path.
The conclusion from the FTP protocol experiment is that an incoming direct
connection is distinguishable from a connection coming via a proxy system. The
distinction is possible due to the setup of FTP-data connection to transfer data
in FTP protocol. In FTP protocol, the average user typing speed/character is no
longer a problem. Because the command arrives at the server after user presses the
enter key. If a generic TCP proxy is used then detection is possible in the session
setup phase and the FTP command packets show similar behavior as seen in the
application level proxy case.
5.1.2 The Approach Implementation for FTP-Control Pro-
tocol
In FTP-control connection, the implementation code is written in a script file named
"ftpcon trol-proxy.bro". The script can be loaded in to Bro IDS to monitor the
incoming FTP connections. The complete source code of the script is given in Ap-
pendix A.3.
The script uses another script named “ftp.bro“ provided with Bro IDS. In ftp.bro,
a session is created when the server receives a FTP request. To implement the given
approach some modifications are made in the ftp.bro and a patch is provided for all
the modifications made in ftp.bro.
The script monitors the event ftp request and records the IPT value of in-
coming request packets. The IPT value of incoming request is stored only when it
is below a threshold (rtt threshold) value.
if ((session$request_t - session$last_request_t) > rtt_cond &&
(session$request_t - session$last_request_t)
< rtt_threshold)
session$sum = session$sum + (session$request_t -
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session$last_request_t);
This is used to avoid the high delay caused by user in sending each command to the
server. The IPT value of the first four command packets satisfying above conditions
is stored in a variable (session$sum). The average of these four values is taken
and if the average is higher than the rtt condition then a warning is logged in to a
file named proxy.log. The script is run on the traffic files captured from the FTP
experiment. The Bro IDS is used for detection of a proxy system in the connection.
sudo bro -r ftp_proxy_10_500msdelay.pcap -r ftp_2proxy_10_300ms_
250msdelay.pcap -r ftp_noproxy_10msdelay.pcap -r
ftp_proxy_10_250msdelay_loss 10%.pcap mt ftpcontrol-proxy
After running the script on traffic files, the warning for a proxy system in the
connection is logged in to the proxy.log file. Each line in the logged entry shows
time on which a connection is marked as a proxy connection. It shows the session
ID for that specific session and records IP address of the client with port number
used to connect at the FTP server.
1239978506.022739 #1 Proxy Connection: 129.241.209.164/59259
> 129.241.208.198/ftp
1239980048.518688 #2 Proxy Connection: 129.241.209.164/40635
> 129.241.208.198/ftp
1239980702.719545 #4 Proxy Connection: 129.241.209.164/54710
> 129.241.208.198/ftp
5.1.3 FTP-Data Protocol Experiment
The motivation for FTP-Data connection experiment is to detect the presence of a
proxy system in the incoming data at the receiving end. The motivation is that the
attacker can use some proxy system to relay the malicious data to the FTP server.
Therefore, if possible, the detection of a proxy system in this case will result in a
warning at the server side, and the administrator can either monitor the connection
closely or terminate it.
The experiment is conducted with the three computer systems under different
network conditions. During the test, a file of 4.1 MB size is transferred from the
FTP client to the FTP server. In the first test case, a direct connection is setup
between the server S and the client C with connection delay of 10ms.
S
10ms←−→ C (5.5)
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In second test case, a proxy system is included and the connection chain is as shown
below.
S
10ms←−→ P 500ms←−−→ C (5.6)
In third test case, the delay between client C and proxy P is kept same to 500ms.
In this test, a 10% packet loss rate is induced to study change in behavior at the
receiving end.
S
10ms←−→ P 500ms(10%loss)←−−−−−−−−→ C (5.7)
The Figure 5.2 illustrates result from the FTP-data experiment. The result shows
IPT values of the data packets transferred on a FTP-data connection. The notation
used in the tests is similar to the FTP-connection experiment.
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Figure 5.2: FTP-Data connection test result with X-axis as Time (sec)
and the Y-axis as interarrival packet time (msec) of data packets on log
scale.
Analysis and Discussion
In the test 5.5, we see that majority of the packets arrive with Interarrival Packet
Time of 10ms or less. When the data transfer starts, the first packet arrives at the
receiver end after two times the total delay on the connection chain. The reason
for the noted behavior is that after receiving the STOR request from the client C,
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the server S initiates a connection and sends a OK (code 150) response. The re-
sponse travels up to the FTP client C and upon receiving the response, the client
C starts the data transfer. Thus, acknowledgment of the data connection setup and
the server OK response causes two times the delay of connection between the server
S and the client C.
In the test case 5.6, the packets start to arrive after 500ms delay even though a
delay between the server S and the peer (proxy P) is 10ms. The delay value of 500ms
is noted during the initial phase of data transfer. The reason for a high delay value
is due to the wait for arrival of ACK packet at the client C from proxy P. However,
after some time the delay value starts to decrease. The reason is the increase in TCP
sender window size, which allows the client C to wait for less time before sending
more data. The behavior is similar to the TCP data transfer mode experiment 3.1.2.
An interesting behavior is seen in the test case 5.7, the packet loss is induced in
the connection between the proxy P and the client C with probability of 10%. The
delay conditions are same as in test case 5.6 and we see the packet start to arrive
with delay equal to 500ms. In this test case, the value of IPT remains near to 500ms
during the whole data transfer session. The reason for this is the packet loss induced
on the connection. The TCP considers the packet loss as a sign of congestion in the
network and reduces the window size. The small window size result in a high delay
as seen in the given result.
The result from FTP-data experiment shows that if the source is behind another
host and relying its data through it, then observing the IPT values, we can identify
whether a peer is a original source of the incoming data or just relaying the data.
5.1.4 The Approach Implementation for FTP-Data Proto-
col
The approach is implemented in a script file named ”ftpdata-proxy.bro”. The script
file can be loaded in to Bro to monitor the incoming FTP-data packets. The com-
plete source code of FTP-data script is given in the Appendix A.4. The script moni-
tors event connection established and if the connection includes FTP-data port
then a new copy of session record is made to store information related to the session.
The script fetches the connection round trip time from conn.bro and adds a
host delay factor based on RTT delay of the connection. The script records IPT
value of the packets whose value is higher than the session$rtt cond.
if((session$pkt_t - session$last_pkt_t) > session$rtt_cond )
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{
session$sum = session$sum + (session$pkt_t - session$last_pkt_t);
After monitoring such five packets, the average of recorded session$sum is taken
and compared with the session$rtt cond. If the average found to be higher than
the session$rtt cond, then a warning is logged in to the proxy.log file. The script
is run on captured files from the experiment and loaded in to the Bro IDS to detect
the proxy connection. The command used to run the script is as.
sudo bro -r ftp_proxy_10_500msdelay.pcap -r ftp_2proxy_10_300ms_
250msdelay.pcap -r ftp_noproxy_10msdelay.pcap -r
ftp_proxy_10_250msdelay_loss\ 10%.pcap mt ftpdata-proxy
The result obtained after running the script on data files is logged in to the proxy.log
file. Each line in the logged entry shows time on which a connection is marked as
a proxy connection. It shows the session ID for that specific session and records IP
address of the client with port number used to connect at the FTP server to transfer
data.
1239978539.096245: #3 Proxy Connection 129.241.208.198/ftp-data
> 129.241.209.164/52228
1239980063.970564: #6 Proxy Connection 129.241.208.198/ftp-data
> 129.241.209.164/43516
1239980731.406602: #12 Proxy Connection 129.241.208.198/ftp-data
> 129.241.209.164/54805
5.1.5 Application to Intrusion Detection
The result from FTP protocol experiments shows that the detection of a proxy sys-
tem is possible in an incoming FTP connection. The main usage for the proposed
approach is the Manual intrusion detection in the case of FTP-control connection.
Whereas in FTP-data connection, the main usage is to monitor the incoming data
and checks the presence of a proxy system in the FTP connection.
If a proxy system is present in the incoming connection then most likely the
incoming file is either a trojan or a malware itself. In both the experiments, if a
proxy system is detected then the administrator can take action according to the
organization policies. One recent case of manual intrusion in which FTP protocol
used is the hacking of Astalavista.com server1. The hackers use FTP to get
contents of the server and later delete most of the contents. If the above approach
would have been used in intrusion detection system, then a warning has been raised
for the suspicious FTP connection and loss can be avoided.
1http://pastebin.com/m4cf55a72
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5.2 HTTP Protocol
The Hyper Text Transfer Protocol is an application layer protocol used to transfer
virtually all types of file between a web client (browser) and a web server on the
network. The HTTP protocol uses TCP as transport protocol to communicate with
the peers. The web browser sends a HTTP request to the web server and the server
reply with HTTP response, which includes result of the received HTTP request.
The HTTP protocol is the main protocol used for accessing email, writing blogs,
downloading any file or access any information resource etc on the network.
5.2.1 Tor Protocol
The Onion Router (Tor) [48] is the network of virtual tunnels, which provide anony-
mous communication to improve privacy of its users on the internet. The anonymous
communication network is first introduced by David Chaum in [23], describing the
use of mix as a fundamental building block for anonymity. A mix act as a store
and forward relay that hides the communication correspondence between messages
it receives and forwards. Several architectures are proposed based on the mix archi-
tecture and implemented to provide anonymize email, most notably Babel [30], and
Mixminion [24]. The problem with the mentioned architectures is their high latency
and is not suitable for web browsing. The Tor is a low latency network and work
on stream level and support high-bandwidth anonymous communication [46].
The Tor architecture is similar to conventional circuit switched networks. The
connection is setup carefully with randomly selected Tor node to preserve anonymity.
The connection is established by negotiating self-signed ephermal Diffie Hellman key
exchange [25]. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to provide forward se-
crecy and data integrity. In Tor, the initiator connects to three Tor nodes (default
settings) which relay traffic to the destination. The Tor does not perform explicit
mixing and data cells are store in separate buffers for each stream connection. The
data cells are forwarded from Tor nodes in a round robin fashion and if any buffer
is empty, it is skipped and data from the next buffer is forwarded. This provides
low latency in the communication and avoids unnecessary delay.
The Tor is used by people from all lifestyles from journalists, militaries to com-
mon people to hide their identity on the internet. The problem with Tor is its
mis-use by malicious users. From study conducted in [38], the authors suggested
that Tor is mis-used mainly for copyright infringement, hacking attempts and web
page defacement. In [38], authors suggested a method to detect the malicious Tor
exit node is whether logging the initiator data or not. However, there is not much
research is performed to detect the request arriving at the HTTP server is coming
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via a proxy such as a Tor framework or not. If such detection is possible then it
will help in fighting against copyright infringement and avoiding innocent users from
being punished due to mis-use of their systems by the hackers.
5.2.2 The HTTP Experiment
The HTTP experiment is performed with a motivation to detect the presence of a
proxy system in an incoming HTTP request at the web server. The objective for
the experiment is to detect the use of Tor framework at the web server due to its
misused in copyright infringement or web page defacement etc. The intuition behind
the detection process is that a web page contains a lot of rich contents and in the
HTTP protocol to fetch a new resource a new GET request is made from the web
client. This GET request will travel from the actual web client system in connection
chain up to the web server and thus will arrive at the web server after total delay of
the connection chain. Generally a new GET request preceded by setting up a new
TCP connection. Thus, the request of new TCP connection (SYN packet) will also
arrives after total delay on the connection chain.
The experiment is performed with the three computer systems. The Apache web
server is setup on system S, a system P is acting as a proxy system and a system C
is acting as a web client. A webpage with rich content is hosted at the web server
and test is performed under the different network conditions. In starting, the test is
performed without any proxy in the connection between the server S and the client
C with network conditions as.
S
20ms←−→ C (5.8)
Now a generic TCP proxy system is included between the web client C and the web
server S under network conditions as.
S
20←−→ P 110ms←−−→ C (5.9)
Now to study behavior of the anonymous proxies available on the internet, a test
is conducted using one of the available free open proxies. The proxy server used
during the test is www.killmyip.com. The delay between the proxy system P and
the web client C and a delay between the proxy system P and the web server S is
as shown below.
S
135ms←−−→ P 135ms←−−→ C (5.10)
Now in another test the behavior of Tor framework is studied at the web server
side for an incoming request in a HTTP session. In the Tor framework, the client
establishes a secure connection among three machines in a connection chain up to
the server S. The test is performed with conditions as shown below.
S
50ms←−→ P3 unknown←−−−−→ P2 unknown←−−−−→ P1 185ms←−−→ C (5.11)
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The Figure 5.3 illustrates result from the HTTP experiment performed under
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Figure 5.3: New TCP connection (SYN packet) and HTTP GET re-
quest interarrival time during HTTP session test. The X-axis as Time
(sec) on log scale and the Y-axis as interarrival packet time (msec) of
SYN and GET request packets on log scale.
different network conditions. The result shows Interarrival Packet Time of a new
connection request (SYN packet) and a new GET request in a HTTP session. The
result labeled as ”No proxy conn req.(20ms delay)“ shows the result of IPT values
from SYN request packets in the test case 5.8. The result marked as ”No Proxy
GET req(20ms delay)” shows the result of IPT values from GET request made
on the newly established connection in the test case 5.8. The result marked as
“Anonymous proxy conn. req.(135ms & 135ms delay)“ shows the result of IPT
values of SYN request packets under the test case 5.10 and similar for GET request
too. The similar notations are used for other test cases.
Analysis and Discussion
The figure 5.3 shows IPT values of the incoming request packets under the different
test cases. In the test case 5.8, the new connection request arrives with in 20ms
delay and the GET request on a newly established connection arrives with in 20ms,
which is a delay between the web server and the web client. In the test case 5.9, a
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generic TCP proxy is used and proxy tool allows web client to establish connection
on more than one port as required in HTTP session to fetch new web resources.
The result shows that the first two new connection request arrives after 100ms delay
or higher, but later the new connection request arrives with approximately 20ms
delay. The GET request in the test case 5.9 arrives with in 20ms delay on the newly
established connection.
The reason for seen behavior is that the proxy tool allows web client to connect
on more than one port simultaneously in an ongoing HTTP session. This result in
arrival of a new request without any further delay at the web server side. Moreover,
the GET request also arrives with in a delay on the connection between web server
and proxy system. Therefore, it is not an appropriate result to make decision about
presence of a proxy in the connection. On internet, the higher delay in initial SYN
request can be a result of congestion on the network and this behavior is not persis-
tent over the complete session. The similar behavior is seen in test case 5.10, where
anonymous proxy is used to access the web page.
In test case 5.11, the Tor framework is used to access a web page hosted on the
web server at lab. From figure 5.3, we see that the new connection request arrives
after a delay of more than one second in initial phase of the HTTP session. The
GET request on a newly established connection arrives after a delay of one second
or more. The behavior of high delay in GET request remains persistent over the
complete HTTP session. The figure shows IPT of incoming request packets regard-
less of port on which the request is made. Therefore from figure it is not clear to
see higher IPT value of GET request. However, the packet trace file shows that the
GET request arrives after a delay of approximately one on each newly established
connection.
In Tor framework, the web client establishes a secure connection with the Tor
entry node and using this single connection the web client establishes secure connec-
tions with two more middle nodes. To maintain the anonymity, the Tor framework
uses only a single connection for communication using SSL protocol layer. The SSL
layer provides multiplexing of the logical channels in to a single connection for more
than one request from the client. The use of a single connection causes higher de-
lay due to handling of more than one connection requests in to logical channels by
multiplexing them. Moreover, the use of encryption in Tor framework results in
a higher delay. The value of delay decreases, when the same Tor nodes are used
again to access the web page or another web page from same server. However, the
IPT value of GET packets remains around 8-10 times of RTT delay of connection
between the exit Tor node and the web server. The similar behavior is noted when
a proxy tool providing only a single port to the client for a HTTP session is used to
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access a web page.
The conclusion from the above experiment is that a connection coming at the
web server directly from a web client is distinguishable from a connection coming
via Tor framework or a SOCKS proxy not providing multiple connections support
to the web client. From the figure 5.3, we see that to access the same web page the
number of connection request is much higher compared to other test case.
One more HTTP experiment is performed to study the data transfer mode under
HTTP protocol. The result from experiment shows similar behavior as seen in the
FTP-data transfer or TCP data transfer mode experiment. Therefore, if a client
starts to send data towards the web server then by monitoring IPT value of incoming
data packets, the presence of a proxy system in the connection can be detected.
5.2.3 The Approach Implementation for HTTP Protocol
The approach for HTTP protocol is implemented in to a script file named ”tor-
proxy.bro”. The script can be loaded in to the Bro IDS to monitor the incoming
HTTP requests at the web server. The complete source code is provided in Ap-
pendix A.5. The script checks all newly established connections through event
connection establi shed. If the connection is an HTTP connection then a ses-
sion is created to store the session related information.
The script records IPT value of a GET request made from the web client. The
values are stored in a table with the corresponding client addresses. The script
monitors IPT value of the first 4 GET requests made by a web client. The average
of these request values is taken and compared with the session$rtt cond. If the
average value is found to be higher than rtt condition then a warning is logged in to
the proxy.log. To test performance of the script, it is run on the data files captured
during the experiment. The script is loaded into Bro IDS using command as.
sudo bro -r http_tor_185_50ms.pcap -r http_20ms_noproxy.pcap
-r http_anony_proxy_135_135ms.pcap -r http_tor_185_
196ms.pcap tor-proxy
The result is logged in to the proxy.log file. The output contains information of any
Tor connection detected in the HTTP communication. Each line in the logged entry
shows time on which a connection is marked as a proxy connection. It shows the
session ID for that specific session and records IP address of the client with port
number used to connect at the web server.
1241537538.209247: #31 Proxy Connection 195.24.77.134/40751
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> 129.241.209.234/http
1241538927.342802: #53 Proxy Connection 205.209.142.210/4756
> 129.241.209.234/http
5.2.4 Application to Tor Detection
The result from HTTP protocol experiment shows that the detection of a proxy
system is possible mainly when the Tor framework is used in communication. The
study conducted by Mccoy et al. [38] suggested that Tor is misused for copyright in-
fringement, hacking attempts and web page defacement. Therefore using the above
approach it is possible to detect the Tor usage at the web server side by monitoring
IPT value of the incoming request packets.
The current trend in malware programs is turned towards the HTTP servers for
their command & control and updates. If the attacker is relaying the update data
for malware through one of the HTTP server then using the given approach it is
possible to detect that the incoming data is coming via a web server, which is acting
as a proxy system. On detection of such proxy system in the incoming connection,
an alarm can be raised and the administrator can closely monitor the connection or
terminate it depending upon organization policies.
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The SMTP Protocol
6.1 SMTP Protocol
The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is used to transfer the email messages
reliably and efficiently on the network. The SMTP uses mainly TCP as its transport
protocol to deliver the messages. The SMTP can deliver a message across multiple
networks using the SMTP mail relay agents. The mail relay agent temporarily stores
a complete message from the another relay agent and then forwards it to the next
relay agent in the direction of destination.
6.2 The Spam Messages
The spam is an unsolicited commercial email message sent by the malicious users
to perform different tasks e.g. advertisement, spreading viruses etc. The spam al-
lures malicious users due to its high speed and low cost of distribution. The spam
constitutes approximate 97% [1] of total email traffic on the internet. Every day
more than 30 billion messages are sent through the internet. The problem of spam
is more serious as most of the spam message can actively harm the recipients by
phishing frauds or malware infections.
Most of the methodologies devised to fight against the spam messages are based
upon checking contents of the messages and filtering them out on the results from
content inspection. The content based filtering of spam messages successfully reduce
the amount of spam that actually reaches up to the user’s account. One of the main
tools employed this methodology to detect spam messages is SpamAssassin [13]. The
Spamassasin tool incorporated several techniques to detect forged X-Mailer headers,
hash busting schemes and Bayes busters [32]. However, all the mentioned methods
detect spam messages based on the result from content inspection. The drawback
in this approach is that the users and administrators must continually update their
filtering rules. The spammers can devise new ways for altering the contents of an
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email to circumvent the filters.
In addition to the content based inspection schemes, many email message filters
also perform lookups in blacklists to determine whether the sender IP address is in
Blacklist [33] or not. The blacklist is a list of known spammers, open relays and open
proxies. There are more than 30 blacklists available to filter out the message based
on IP address contained in blacklist. The effectiveness of blacklists is reduced to 80%
due to short-lived IP addresses of the computer systems used to send spam messages.
To fight spam more effectively a new methodology is needed. The authors in [45]
study the network level behavior of spams and provide information to filter them
before their outspread across the internet. The intuition behind monitoring the
network level behavior is that it helps to filter the spam messages near to its origin
point. Whereas content based approach waits for the message to reach up to mon-
itoring host and then runs spam test to filter it. The authors studied the network
level characteristics such as: IP addresses range of hosts sending most spams, com-
mon spamming modes (e.g. open relay proxies, botnets), spamming host uptime and
behavior of botnets, which are responsible for spreading spams. They suggested that
most of the spams are sent by botnets and most of bots IP addresses are short-lived.
The bots in botnets act as SOCKS proxies and use the system owner’s credentials
to forward spam messages.
6.3 SMTP Experiment
The objective for SMTP protocol experiment is to find that if a peer sending an
email message is either acting as a proxy or it is a legitimate sender of the email mes-
sage. The motivation for the experiment is to stop the spam messages coming from
proxybots by detecting the systems acting as proxies for the spammers and dropping
messages coming from them. These proxybots act as SOCKS proxies, generic TCP
level proxy, for spammers and help them to hide their real IP addresses, and allow
them to forward spams anonymously using legitimate IP addresses.
The experiment is performed with the three computer systems. The system C is
acting as a mail client to send spam, the system P is acting as a generic TCP proxy
and the system S is the mail server. The server S can be any mail relay agent used
to forwards the messages to another relays or it can be the end destination for a
user mail message.
In the starting, some tests are performed without any proxy system on the
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network link between the server S and the client C.
S
10ms←−→ C (6.1)
In another test, we increase the delay to study the behavioral change under different
network delay conditions.
S
20ms←−→ C (6.2)
Now we include a proxy system P in the connection between the client S and the
server S under network conditions as.
S
10ms←−→ P 40ms←−→ C (6.3)
Now delay between the client C and the proxy P is kept same but delay between
the proxy P and the server S is increased up to 20ms.
S
20ms←−→ P 40ms←−→ C (6.4)
Now delay between the client C and the proxy system P is increased to see the
change in behavior at the receiving end S.
S
20←−→ P 200ms←−−→ C (6.5)
The Figure 6.1 illustrates result from the SMTP experiment. The figure shows IPT
values of incoming SMTP request packets [34] ( HELO, MAIL FROM, RCPT TO)
and the ACK packets with data size equal to zero. The figure shows result from the
different test cases. The result marked as ”No proxy with 10ms delay” shows the
test case 6.1 and the result marked with ”Proxy with 10ms and 40ms delay” shows
the test case 6.3. The similar notation is used for all the other test cases.
Analysis and Discussion
The result from above experiment indicates that at the receiving end by monitoring
the IPT values of incoming request packets, we can distinguish whether the peer
sending a message is either acting as a proxy or it is the real originator of the mes-
sage. From the test 6.1, we can see that a request packet from the sender arrives
with 10ms interarrival packet time or slightly higher due to the host workload de-
lay. The similar behavior is seen in the test 6.2, where packet arrives with 20ms
interarrival packet time or slightly higher. When a proxy system is included in the
connection chain, we see a different behavior at the receiving end. The SMTP re-
quest packets start to arrive after higher values of IPT. In the test 6.3, we see that
ACK packets from the proxy system P arrive with a IPT value of 10ms or slightly
higher. Whereas the SMTP command packets arrive after 40ms or higher IPT value
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Figure 6.1: SMTP connection test result with the X-axis as time (sec)
and the Y-axis as inter arrival packet time (msec) on log scale.
at the server S. The similar behavior is seen in the test 6.4 and test 6.5, where ACK
packets arrive after 20ms delay and SMTP request packets arrive after 40ms and
200ms delay correspondingly.
The reason for the seen behavior is the proxy system P is acting like a generic
TCP proxy and just relaying the packets in both directions. After the TCP connec-
tion is established between the server S and the proxy P, the proxy system P relays a
greeting message from the server S to the client C. The greeting message travels the
complete path from the server S to the client C. After relaying the greeting message,
the proxy system P sends an ACK to the server S that arrives with a IPT value
equals to delay between them. For example in test 6.3, the ACK packet arrives
after 10ms at the server side. After receiving the greeting message, the client C
sends a HELO message to the server S via the proxy system P. The HELO message
travels from the client C to the server S and results in arrival at the server side
after one RTT delay (10ms + 40ms) between them. Therefore, all the command
packets arrive at the server side after one complete RTT delay (IPT of ACK + IPT
of request) of the connection between the mail server and the mail client. The same
behavior is seen in all the test cases performed under presence of a proxy system.
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The conclusion from the above experiment is that a SMTP connection coming
directly at the mail server can be distinguished from an incoming SMTP connection
coming via proxy system. The detection is possible due to the journey of response
from mail server back to the mail client and arrival of the next command at the mail
server by completing the journey from the mail client to the mail server. If the proxy
system first stores a message and then forwards it to the mail server then detection
is not possible. Because at the mail server, the incoming SMTP connection behaves
similar to a legitimate case when proxy system itself is sending a message to the
mail server.
6.4 SMTP Experiment with Attachment
The SMTP experiment with an attachment is conducted to study the behavior in
a case when an email message has an attachment attached to it. The experiment is
performed under three different network delay conditions.
S
20ms←−→ C (6.6)
In second test, the proxy system P is included with network conditions as
S
20ms←−→ P 40ms←−→ C (6.7)
In third test, delay between the proxy P and the client C is increased up to 200ms.
S
20ms←−→ P 200ms←−−→ C (6.8)
The Figure 6.2 shows result from the above experiment. The result shows inter-
arrival packet time of the incoming packets with data size greater than zero. The
notation methodology used in this experiment is similar to the section 6.3.
Analysis and Discussion
The result from above experiment shows that the presence of a proxy system in the
connection between the server S and the client C results in a distinguished behavior
at the server S. In all the three test cases, we have seen that the command packets
arrive according to delay between the client C and the server S. After the initial
three packets (SMTP command packets) in each session, the attachment data pack-
ets start to arrive at the server side. We see that the data packets start to arrive
according to RTT delay on the connection between the server S and the client C.
This behavior is similar to the TCP data transfer mode experiment 3.1.2.
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Figure 6.2: SMTP with attachment test result with the X-axis as time
(sec) on log scale and the Y-axis as inter arrival packet time (msec) on
log scale.
The explanation for the obtained result is the TCP window size restriction. The
TCP window size limits amount of data transmission to the receiver. Initially after
sending 2-3 data packets, the client C waits for an ACK to arrive before sending
more data packets. This causes new data packets to arrive at the server S after a
delay equal to one RTT delay on the connection between them. This behavior causes
delay in new data arrival at the server end and reveals the actual delay between the
server S and the client C. The similar behavior is seen in all the three test cases.
The conclusion from the SMTP attachment experiment is that at the receiving
end, we can detect whether the peer sending a mail message is either acting as a
proxy or is a real originator of the message. The result obtained from this experiment
coupled with SMTP experiment 6.3 will result in detection of spam messages with
high confidence, when spam messages are sent by proxy bots.
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6.5 The Approach Implementation for SMTP Pro-
tocol
The proposed approach to detect the spam messages is implemented in a script file
named ”smtp-proxy.bro”. The script can be loaded in the Bro IDS to monitor IPT
values of the incoming SMTP connections. The complete source code is given in
Appendix A.6. The script monitors all newly established TCP connection and if the
connection is a SMTP connection then the scripts start to monitor IPT values of
the incoming request packets.
The script uses a SMTP session record specified in a ”smtp.bro” script provided
with the Bro IDS. Some additions are done to the ”smtp.bro” to store the IPT
values and related information. A patch is provided with the report for all the
modifications. The script records IPT values of incoming SMTP request packets,
which have value higher than the RTT conditions. After the first four request
packets are received at the mail server, the script takes average of the IPT values
and compares it with the RTT condition. If the average value is found higher than
the RTT condition then a warning is logged in to the proxy.log. The script is run
on the data files captured during the experiment to detect spam messages coming
from the proxy system. The script is loaded in to the Bro IDS and following data
files are used to test the script.
sudo bro -r smtp_20_200_proxy_att.pcap -r smtp_20_noproxy.pcap
-r smtp_20_40_proxy.pcap mt -r smtp_20_200_proxy.pcap
smtp-proxy
The result obtained from running the script on above data files is logged in to the
proxy.log file. Each line in the logged entry shows time on which a connection is
marked as a proxy connection. It shows the session ID for that specific session and
records IP address of the client with port number used to connect at the mail server.
1241088659.242469 #1 Proxy Connection: 129.241.209.164/58208
> 129.241.208.198/smtp
1241107929.170802 #3 Proxy Connection: 129.241.209.164/42145
> 129.241.208.198/smtp
1244108153.509671 #4 Proxy Connection: 129.241.209.234/45166
> 129.241.208.186/smtp
6.6 Application to Spam Detection
Currently in the internet, there are thousands of active proxybots which are helping
the spammer to send spam messages in to the network. The result from SMTP
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protocol experiments shows that at the mail server, it is possible to detect the pres-
ence of proxybots in an incoming request. Therefore, the approach can be applied
for detection of the spam messages coming from such proxybots. If the test about
proxybots shows positive result then the incoming message is most likely a spam
and can be dropped. The given approach mainly works near to the spam originating
point and helps to detect spam before its outspread in the network.
The study conducted by Ramachandran et. al [45] suggests that most of bots in
the botnets have short lived IP addresses and this causes a decrease in efficiency of
blacklist used to detect the open proxy systems. Therefore, the above approach can
detect such proxybots in the botnets without any need for previous information. If
a mail server receives many spam messages from a computer system and behavior
is persistent, then its IP address can be added in to the blacklists to avoid spam
messages from it in the future. The given approach can be coupled with the existing
approaches to detect spams e.g. Spamassassin [13] and lead to almost zero percent
false positive rate in detection of the spam messages.
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Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 General Discussion
The result from experiments performed on different application layer protocols
showed that on the receiver side, it is possible to distinguish from an incoming
TCP connection whether the peer is acting as a proxy system or the peer is a real
originator of the connection. The distinction depends upon two main factors.
 Application Protocol Type : The application layer protocols have its own
characteristics. These characteristics result in different behavior at the re-
ceiver end under different network conditions. For example, the SSH protocol
behaves differently than Telnet due to its custom window size. However, dur-
ing bulk data transfer mode similar behavior was noticed, irrespective of any
application protocol used to transfer data.
 Proxy Type : the type of proxy used in the communication session results
in distinct behavior at the receiver end. From the experiment conducted on
different application protocols, we saw that when a generic TCP proxy is used
on the proxy system, then the actual session is setup between the server and
the client and not between the server and the proxy system. This results in
detection of a proxy system in the early phase of session setup as a message
will travel from the server to the client. If the application protocol itself is
used at a proxy system then it results in a session establishment between the
server and the proxy system and behavior of IPT values at the server side is
similar to a legitimate case.
From the study conducted in this master dissertation, a conclusion was drawn
when more than one proxy systems are present in the network path. The behavior
in the given case will be different under the different application layer protocols and
the type of the proxy used. If the generic TCP proxy is used in remote login pro-
tocols then on the receiving end, delay will be the sum of delays of all connections
in the connection chain up to the receiver. Whereas if an application level proxy is
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used in remote login protocols, then observed delay at the receiver end will be equal
to the maximum delay of any connection in the connection chain.
In the FTP protocol, we have seen that delay noticed at the receiver side is equal
to the sum of delays of all connections in the connection chain. The SMTP protocol
showed similar behavior if more than one proxy system is present in the connection
chain. In the bulk data transfer mode, delay observed at the receiver side will be
equal to the maximum delay of any connection in the connection chain.
7.2 Conclusion
The goal of this master dissertation was to find if it possible for a receiver to decide
whether the other end of a TCP connection is a real originator of the connection or
merely acting as an intermediary host in the connection chain. The attackers relay
their attack through intermediary hosts to hide their true IP addresses and remain
anonymous on the network. The use of intermediary hosts helps them from being
traced and gets punished.
This master dissertation proposes an approach, which enables a receiver to de-
tect whether the peer communicating on a TCP connection is a real originator of
the connection or merely a proxy system in the connection chain. The approach re-
lies upon the use of Nagle algorithm and the TCP congestion control algorithms to
transfer data on a TCP connection. The approach monitors the Interarrival packet
time value of incoming packets at the receiver and based upon this information a
decision is made. The approach was tested on different application layer protocols
and found effective on most of them. The approach can be used in many appli-
cations like Manual intrusion detection to detect the break in attempts, Tor usage
detection to avoid the copyright infringement or web page defacement and detection
of a spam message when the message is received from proxy bots.
The approach can be coupled with the existing methods to detect network based
attacks. This coupling with existing methods will result in a very high confidence
in detection of such network based attacks and decrease in false warning rate. For
example, if a spam filter detects an incoming message as a spam but with some
uncertainty then using the proposed approach, the source of incoming message can
be checked. If the source appears to be a proxy system then incoming message is a
spam without any uncertainty.
The approach is able to detect the proxy system on an incoming connection,
as long as the attacker uses intermediary hosts to relay his traffic. However, if the
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attacker uses intermediary host in store-and-forward way during the attack then
detection is not possible. The later case will result in a similar behavior as the last
intermediary host initiates a communication in a legitimate case.
7.3 Future Work
In this study, the experiments were performed on a test bed in the laboratory. It
would be an interesting work to study performance of the proposed approach in a
large scale network such as an ISP network.
The implementation provided for the proposed approach is in a beta version. In
the current implementation, the Round Trip Time (RTT) of an incoming connec-
tion is calculated during the initial TCP 3-way handshake. However, the RTT value
can vary in the network during the lifetime of a session e.g. due to occurrence of
a congestion in the network. It would be a good approach to calculate RTT value,
which reflects current network conditions. The current value of RTT will also result
in less false positive rate.
It would also be an interesting idea to study a change in latency behavior at the
receiving end, when either a sender or a proxy system is loaded. The load can be
caused either by a sudden increase of work load or by a denial of service attack on
the system.
The approach can be applied to more applications, which use proxy systems. It
would be an interesting work to find more applications, and test the given approach
on them. One such application is the digital forensics investigation. During the in-
vestigation of an attack, the peer from which TCP connection is received; becomes
a victim of suspicion. The investigator can use the proposed approach and study
available traffic traces to decide whether the peer actually launched an attack or
was merely used as a stepping stone by the attacker.
The approach is going to be used in the OISF’s next generation Intrusion De-
tection System [2].
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Appendix A
A.1 Manual Intrusion Detection in SSH Protocol
1 # The given code can detect the presence of a proxy system ,
2 # in the inital key exchange phase . This will detect the
3 # presence of only generic TCP proxy .
4
5 @load mt
6
7 type ssh_session_info : record {
8 id : count ;
9 connection_id : conn_id ;
10 rtt : interval ;
11 rtt_cond : interval ;
12 last_pkt_t : time ;
13 pkt_t : time ;
14 pkt_cnt : count ;
15 count_p : count ;
16 sum : interval ;
17 avg_t : interval ;
18 alarmp : bool ;
19 } ;
20
21 global ssh_sessions : table [ conn_id ] of ssh_session_info ;
22 global ssh_session_id = 0 ;
23 const proxy_file = open_log_file (” proxy ”) &redef ;
24
25 function new_ssh_session (c : connection )
26 {
27 local session = c$id ;
28 local new_id = ++ssh_session_id ;
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29 local info : ssh_session_info ;
30 info$id = new_id ;
31 info$connection_id = session ;
32 info$rtt = 0sec ;
33 info$rtt_cond = 0sec ;
34 info$last_pkt_t = c$start_time ;
35 info$pkt_t = c$start_time ;
36 info$pkt_cnt = 0 ;
37 info$count_p = 0 ;
38 info$sum = 0 sec ;
39 info$avg_t = 0 sec ;
40 info$alarmp = F ;
41
42 ssh_sessions [ session ] = info ;
43 }
44
45 function is_ssh_conn (c : connection ) : bool
46 {
47 return c$id$resp_p == 22/tcp ;
48 }
49
50 event new_packet (c : connection , p : pkt_hdr )
51 {
52 local id = c$id ;
53 i f ( id ! in ssh_sessions )
54 return ;
55 local session = ssh_sessions [ id ] ;
56 session$rtt = connection_rtt ( c$id ) ;
57 i f ( session$rtt > . 05 sec )
58 session$rtt_cond = session$rtt *1 . 2 5 ;
59 else
60 session$rtt_cond = session$rtt * 2 . 5 ;
61 i f ( p$ip$src == id$orig_h && p$tcp$flags != TH_ACK && ←↩
session$pkt_cnt < 7)
62 {
63 session$pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
64 ++session$pkt_cnt ;
65 i f ( ( session$pkt_t − session$last_pkt_t ) > ←↩
session$rtt_cond )
66 {
67 session$sum = session$sum + ( session$pkt_t − ←↩
session$last_pkt_t ) ;
68 ++session$count_p ;
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69 i f ( session$pkt_cnt >= 7 && ! session$alarmp )
70 {
71 session$avg_t = ( session$sum /( session$count_p ) )←↩
;
72 i f ( session$avg_t > session$rtt_cond )
73 {
74 print proxy_file , fmt (”%.6f : #%s Proxy ←↩
Connection %s” , network_time ( ) , ←↩
prefixed_id ( session$id ) , id_string ( c$id )←↩
) ;
75 session$alarmp = T ;
76 }
77 }
78 }
79 }
80 session$last_pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
81 }
82
83 event connection_established (c : connection )
84 {
85 i f ( is_ssh_conn (c ) )
86 {
87 local id = c$id ;
88 i f ( id ! in ssh_sessions )
89 new_ssh_session (c ) ;
90 }
91 }
A.2 Manual Intrusion Detection in Telnet Proto-
col
1 @load mt
2
3
4 type telnet_session_info : record {
5 id : count ;
6 state : bool ;
7 connection_id : conn_id ;
8 rtt : interval ;
9 rtt_cond : interval ;
10 first_pkt_t : time ;
11 last_pkt_t : time ;
79
A. APPENDIX A
12 pkt_t : time ;
13
14 chkcond_f : bool ;
15 count_p : count ;
16 sum : interval ;
17 avg_t : interval ;
18
19 alarmp : bool ;
20 pkt_cnt : count ;
21 nwpchk_f : bool ;
22 proxycond_f : bool ;
23 } ;
24
25
26 global telnet_sessions : table [ conn_id ] of telnet_session_info ;
27 const rtt_threshold = 1.2 sec ;
28 global first_pkt_t : time ;
29 global type_speed = .25 sec ;
30 global type_brk = .7 sec ;
31 global telnet_session_id = 0 ;
32 global arrival_t : table [ conn_id , count ] of interval ;
33 const proxy_file = open_log_file (” proxy ”) &redef ;
34
35
36 function new_telnet_session (c : connection )
37 {
38 local session = c$id ;
39 local new_id = ++telnet_session_id ;
40
41 local info : telnet_session_info ;
42 info$id = new_id ;
43 info$state = F ;
44 info$connection_id = session ;
45 info$rtt = 0sec ;
46 info$rtt_cond = 0sec ;
47 info$first_pkt_t = c$start_time ;
48 info$last_pkt_t = c$start_time ;
49 info$pkt_t = c$start_time ;
50
51 info$alarmp = F ;
52 info$chkcond_f = F ;
53 info$count_p = 0 ;
54 info$sum = 0 sec ;
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55 info$avg_t = 0 sec ;
56 info$pkt_cnt = 1 ;
57 info$nwpchk_f = F ;
58 info$proxycond_f = T ;
59
60 telnet_sessions [ session ] = info ;
61 }
62
63 function is_telnet_conn (c : connection ) : bool
64 {
65 return c$id$resp_p == telnet | | c$id$resp_p == rlogin ;
66 }
67
68 event login_success (c : connection , user : string , client_user : ←↩
string ,
69 password : string , line : string )
70 {
71 local id = c$id ;
72 local session = telnet_sessions [ id ] ;
73 session$state= T ;
74 }
75
76 event new_packet (c : connection , p : pkt_hdr )
77 {
78
79 local id = c$id ;
80 i f ( id ! in telnet_sessions )
81 return ;
82
83 local session = telnet_sessions [ id ] ;
84
85 i f ( ! session$state )
86 {
87 session$rtt = connection_rtt ( c$id ) ;
88 i f ( session$rtt > . 05 sec )
89 session$rtt_cond = ( session$rtt *1 . 25 ) ;
90 else
91 session$rtt_cond = ( session$rtt *2) ;
92 type_brk = type_brk + session$rtt_cond ;
93
94 i f ( p$ip$src == id$orig_h && p$tcp$flags != TH_ACK )
95 {
96 i f ( session$count_p < 4 && ! session$nwpchk_f )
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97 {
98 session$pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
99 session$sum = session$sum + ( session$pkt_t − ←↩
session$last_pkt_t ) ;
100 ++session$count_p ;
101 ++session$pkt_cnt ;
102 }
103 i f ( session$count_p >= 4 && ! session$nwpchk_f )
104 {
105 session$avg_t = ( session$sum /( session$count_p ) ) ;
106 i f ( session$avg_t > session$rtt_cond )
107 {
108 print proxy_file , fmt (”%.6f : #%s Proxy ←↩
Connection using generic TCP proxy %s” , ←↩
network_time ( ) , prefixed_id ( session$id ) , ←↩
id_string ( c$id ) ) ;
109 session$alarmp = T ;
110 }
111 session$nwpchk_f = T ;
112 }
113 i f ( session$nwpchk_f )
114 {
115 session$sum = 0 sec ;
116 session$count_p = 0 ;
117 session$pkt_cnt = 0 ;
118 session$avg_t = 0 sec ;
119 session$pkt_t = c$start_time ;
120 session$last_pkt_t = c$start_time ;
121 }
122 }
123 session$last_pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
124 return ;
125 }
126
127 i f ( p$ip$src == id$orig_h && p$tcp$flags != TH_ACK )
128 {
129 session$pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
130 i f ( ( ( session$pkt_t − session$first_pkt_t ) < 90sec ←↩
&& session$pkt_cnt < 10) && ! ( p$tcp$flags == ←↩
TH_ACK + TH_FIN ) )
131 {
132 i f ( ( session$pkt_t − session$last_pkt_t ) > ←↩
rtt_threshold )
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133 session$last_pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
134
135 i f ( ( session$pkt_t − session$last_pkt_t ) > 0sec ←↩
&& ( session$pkt_t − session$last_pkt_t ) < ←↩
type_brk )
136 {
137 session$sum = session$sum + ( session$pkt_t ←↩
− session$last_pkt_t ) ;
138 ++session$count_p ;
139 ++session$pkt_cnt ;
140 }
141 session$chkcond_f = T ;
142 }
143
144 i f ( ( ! session$chkcond_f | | p$tcp$flags == TH_ACK +←↩
TH_FIN ) && session$proxycond_f )
145 {
146 session$avg_t = ( session$sum /( session$count_p − 1) )←↩
;
147 session$rtt_cond = session$rtt_cond + type_speed ;
148 i f ( session$avg_t > session$rtt_cond && ! ←↩
session$alarmp )
149 {
150 print proxy_file , fmt (”%.6f : #%s Proxy ←↩
Connection %s” , network_time ( ) , ←↩
prefixed_id ( session$id ) , id_string ( c$id )←↩
) ;
151 }
152 session$proxycond_f = F ;
153 }
154 session$last_pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
155 session$chkcond_f = F ;
156 }
157 }
158
159 event connection_established (c : connection )
160 {
161 i f ( is_telnet_conn (c ) )
162 {
163 local id = c$id ;
164 i f ( id ! in telnet_sessions )
165 new_telnet_session (c ) ;
166 }
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167 }
A.3 Manual Intrusion Detection in FTP-Control
Protocol
1 # The given code can detect the presence of intermediary hosts
2 # in the incoming FTP commands by monitoring the IPT values
3 # of requests .
4
5 @load ftp
6
7 const proxy_file = open_log_file (” proxy ”) &redef ;
8 global rtt : interval ;
9 global rtt_cond : interval ;
10 const rtt_threshold = 1.2 sec ;
11 # Event generated by Bro when a ftp request is received from ←↩
ftp client
12 event ftp_request (c : connection , command : string , arg : string )
13 {
14 local request = arg == ”” ? command : cat ( command , ” ” , arg←↩
) ;
15 rtt = connection_rtt ( c$id ) ;
16 i f ( rtt > . 05 sec )
17 rtt_cond = rtt *1 . 2 5 ;
18 else
19 rtt_cond = rtt *2 ;
20 local id = c$id ;
21 local session = FTP : : ftp_sessions [ id ] ;
22 session$request = request ;
23 ++session$num_req ;
24 session$request_t = network_time ( ) ;
25 i f ( ( session$request_t − session$last_request_t ) > rtt_cond←↩
&& ( session$request_t − session$last_request_t ) < ←↩
rtt_threshold )
26 session$sum = session$sum + ( session$request_t − ←↩
session$last_request_t ) ;
27 i f ( ( session$num_req > 4) && ( session$sum/session$num_req ) ←↩
> rtt_cond && ! session$alarmp )
28 {
29 print proxy_file , fmt (”%.6f #%s Proxy Connection : %s” ,
30 network_time ( ) , prefixed_id ( session$id ) , id_string (←↩
c$id ) ) ;
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31 session$alarmp = T ;
32 }
33 session$last_request_t = network_time ( ) ;
34 }
A.4 Intermediary Hosts Detection in FTP-Data
Protocol
1 # The code below can detect the presence of intermediary hosts
2 # in the incoming data from a peer . The code monitors mainly
3 # the IPT values which are higher than the RTT condition .
4
5 @load mt
6
7 type ftpdata_session_info : record {
8 id : count ;
9 connection_id : conn_id ;
10 rtt : interval ;
11 rtt_cond : interval ;
12 last_pkt_t : time ;
13 pkt_t : time ;
14 count_p : count ;
15 sum : interval ;
16 avg_t : interval ;
17 alarmp : bool ;
18 } ;
19
20 global ftpdata_sessions : table [ conn_id ] of ftpdata_session_info←↩
;
21 global ftpdata_session_id = 0 ;
22 const proxy_file = open_log_file (” proxy ”) &redef ;
23
24 function new_ftpdata_session (c : connection )
25 {
26 local session = c$id ;
27 local new_id = ++ftpdata_session_id ;
28 local info : ftpdata_session_info ;
29 info$id = new_id ;
30 info$connection_id = session ;
31 info$rtt = 0sec ;
32 info$rtt_cond = 0sec ;
33 info$last_pkt_t = c$start_time ;
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34 info$pkt_t = c$start_time ;
35 info$count_p = 0 ;
36 info$sum = 0 sec ;
37 info$avg_t = 0 sec ;
38 info$alarmp = F ;
39
40 ftpdata_sessions [ session ] = info ;
41 }
42
43 function is_ftpdata_conn (c : connection ) : bool
44 {
45 return c$id$orig_p == 20/tcp ;
46 }
47
48 event new_packet (c : connection , p : pkt_hdr )
49 {
50
51 local id = c$id ;
52 i f ( id ! in ftpdata_sessions )
53 return ;
54 local session = ftpdata_sessions [ id ] ;
55 i f ( p$ip$src == id$resp_h && p$tcp$flags == 24)
56 {
57 session$pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
58 session$rtt = connection_rtt ( c$id ) ;
59 i f ( session$rtt > . 05 sec )
60 session$rtt_cond = session$rtt *1 . 2 5 ;
61 else
62 session$rtt_cond = session$rtt * 2 . 5 ;
63
64 i f ( ( session$pkt_t − session$last_pkt_t ) > ←↩
session$rtt_cond )
65 {
66 session$sum = session$sum + ( session$pkt_t − ←↩
session$last_pkt_t ) ;
67 ++session$count_p ;
68 i f ( session$count_p > 5 && ! session$alarmp )
69 {
70 session$avg_t = ( session$sum /( session$count_p ) )←↩
;
71 i f ( session$avg_t > session$rtt_cond )
72 {
73 print proxy_file , fmt (”%.6f : #%s Proxy ←↩
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Connection %s” , network_time ( ) , ←↩
prefixed_id ( session$id ) , id_string ( c$id )←↩
) ;
74 session$alarmp = T ;
75 }
76 }
77 }
78 }
79 session$last_pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
80 }
81
82 event connection_established (c : connection )
83 {
84 i f ( is_ftpdata_conn (c ) )
85 {
86 local id = c$id ;
87 i f ( id ! in ftpdata_sessions )
88 new_ftpdata_session (c ) ;
89 }
90 }
A.5 Tor Detection in HTTP Protocol
1 # The given code can detect the Tor usage in an incoming HTTP
2 # request at the web server . The IPT value of first four GET
3 # requests are analyzed to check the presence of proxy system .
4
5 @load mt
6
7 # HTTP Session record to store the IPT values , Id , seesion info←↩
.
8 type http_session_info : record {
9 id : count ;
10 connection_id : conn_id ;
11 rtt : interval ;
12 rtt_cond : interval ;
13 last_pkt_t : time ;
14 pkt_t : time ;
15 } ;
16 # HTTP GET request record to store the GET request IPT value , ←↩
client add , no . of GET request .
17 type get_request : record {
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18 get_time : interval ;
19 client_addr : addr ;
20 get_cnt : count ;
21 get_avg : interval ;
22 alarmp : bool ;
23 } ;
24
25 global http_get_requests : table [ addr ] of get_request ;
26 global http_sessions : table [ conn_id ] of http_session_info ;
27 global http_session_id = 0 ;
28 const proxy_file = open_log_file (” proxy ”) &redef ;
29 # Function to initialize the new HTTP session
30 function new_http_session (c : connection )
31 {
32 local session = c$id ;
33 local new_id = ++http_session_id ;
34 local info : http_session_info ;
35 info$id = new_id ;
36 info$connection_id = session ;
37 info$rtt = 0sec ;
38 info$rtt_cond = 0sec ;
39 info$last_pkt_t = c$start_time ;
40 info$pkt_t = c$start_time ;
41
42 http_sessions [ session ] = info ;
43 }
44
45 function is_http_conn (c : connection ) : bool
46 {
47 return c$id$resp_p == 80/tcp ;
48 }
49 # Function to initialize the new GET request
50 function new_http_get (c : connection )
51 {
52 local client_a = c$id$orig_h ;
53 local req : get_request ;
54
55 req$get_time = 0 sec ;
56 req$client_addr = client_a ;
57 req$get_cnt = 1 ;
58 req$get_avg = 0 sec ;
59 req$alarmp = F ;
60
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61 http_get_requests [ client_a ] = req ;
62 }
63
64 event new_packet (c : connection , p : pkt_hdr )
65 {
66
67 local id = c$id ;
68 i f ( id ! in http_sessions )
69 return ;
70 local session = http_sessions [ id ] ;
71 i f ( p$ip$src == id$orig_h && p$tcp$flags == 16)
72 session$last_pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
73 i f ( p$ip$src == id$orig_h && p$tcp$flags == 24)
74 {
75 session$pkt_t = network_time ( ) ;
76 i f ( p$ip$src ! in http_get_requests )
77 new_http_get (c ) ;
78 local get_requestl = http_get_requests [ p$ip$src ] ;
79 get_requestl$get_time = get_requestl$get_time + (←↩
session$pkt_t − session$last_pkt_t ) ;
80 ++get_requestl$get_cnt ;
81 i f ( get_requestl$get_cnt > 4 && ! get_requestl$alarmp )
82 {
83 get_requestl$get_avg = get_requestl$get_time/←↩
get_requestl$get_cnt ;
84 session$rtt = connection_rtt ( c$id ) ;
85 i f ( session$rtt > . 05 sec )
86 session$rtt_cond = session$rtt *1 . 2 5 ;
87 else
88 session$rtt_cond = session$rtt * 2 . 5 ;
89 i f ( get_requestl$get_avg > session$rtt_cond )
90 print proxy_file , fmt (”%.6f : #%s Proxy ←↩
Connection %s” , network_time ( ) , prefixed_id (←↩
session$id ) , id_string ( c$id ) ) ;
91 get_requestl$alarmp = T ;
92 }
93
94 }
95 }
96
97 event connection_established (c : connection )
98 {
99 i f ( is_http_conn (c ) )
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100 {
101 local id = c$id ;
102 i f ( id ! in http_sessions )
103 new_http_session (c ) ;
104 }
105 }
A.6 Spam Detection in SMTP Protocol
1 # The code below can detect the presence of a proxybots
2 # by monitoring the IPT values of incoming SMTP requests .
3
4 @load smtp
5
6 const proxy_file = open_log_file (” proxy ”) &redef ;
7 global rtt : interval ;
8 global rtt_cond : interval ;
9 # Event generated by Bro IDS when a SMTP request is received ←↩
from client
10 event smtp_request (c : connection , is_orig : bool , command : ←↩
string , arg : string )
11 {
12 local request = arg == ”” ? command : cat ( command , ” ” , arg←↩
) ;
13 rtt = connection_rtt ( c$id ) ;
14 i f ( rtt > . 05 sec )
15 rtt_cond = rtt *1 . 2 5 ;
16 else
17 rtt_cond = rtt *2 ;
18 local id = c$id ;
19 local session = SMTP : : smtp_sessions [ id ] ;
20 i f ( session$origin_h == id$orig_h )
21 ++session$num_req ;
22 session$request_t = network_time ( ) ;
23 i f ( ( session$request_t − session$last_request_t ) > rtt_cond←↩
)
24 session$sum = session$sum + ( session$request_t − ←↩
session$last_request_t ) ;
25 i f ( ( session$num_req > 4) && ( session$sum /( session$num_req )←↩
) > rtt_cond && ! session$alarmp )
26 {
27 print proxy_file , fmt (”%.6f #%s Proxy Connection : %s ” ,←↩
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network_time ( ) , prefixed_id ( session$id ) , id_string (←↩
c$id ) ) ;
28 session$alarmp = T ;
29 }
30 session$last_request_t = network_time ( ) ;
31 }
91

B
Appendix B
B.1 Upload Folder Contents
The Upload folder contains three subfolders: -
1. Experiment Data: This folder contains captured traffic files from all the
experiments performed in this thesis work. The files are classified according
to the chapter numbers. In each chapter folder, there are subfolders corre-
sponding to the experiment of different application protocols.
2. Implementation code: This folder contains the implementation code for all
the application protocols. The folder also contains the patch files for ”conn.bro,
ftp.bro and smtp.bro” files.
3. Scripts used in experiments: This folder contains the script used to per-
form the experiments for different protocols. Most of the scripts used to per-
form experiments are written by the author himself. They are classified ac-
cording to the chapter numbers. The Chapter 3 folder contains TG script used
to generate TCP traffic and a script to act as a server to receive TCP traffic.
The Chapter 4 folder contains Expect script used to perform SSH and Telnet
experiments. The Chapter 5 folder contains a script used as a web proxy in
HTTP experiment.
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